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Veil-Piercing
Peter B. Oh*
From its inception veil-piercing has been a scourge on corporate law.
Exactly when the veil of limited liability can and will be circumvented to reach
into a shareholder's own assets has befuddled courts, litigants, and scholars
alike. And the doctrine has been bedeviled by empirical evidence of a chasm
between the theory and practice of veil-piercing; notably, veil-piercing claims
inexplicably seem to prevail more often in Contract than Tort, a finding that
flouts the engraineddistinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors.
With a dataset of 2,908 cases from 1658 to 2006, this study presents the
most comprehensiveportraitof veil-piercing decisions yet. Unlike predecessors,
this study examines Fraud,a long-suspected accessory to veil-piercing, as well
as specific subclaims in Contract, Tort, and Fraud, to provide a fine-grained
portraitof voluntary and involuntary creditors. And this study analyzes the rationales instrumentalto a piercing decision.
The findings largely comport with our legal intuitions. The most successful
civil veil-piercing claims lie in Fraud or involve specific evidence offraud or
misrepresentation. Further, claims not only prevail more often in Tort than
Contract, but they also adhere to the voluntary-involuntary creditordistinction.
Surprisingly, though, veil-piercing presents a greater risk to individual
shareholders than corporategroups.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. B.A., Yale College;
J.D., The University of Chicago. I thank Steven A. Bank, Douglas M. Branson, Mirit Eyal-Cohen,
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Henry B. Hansmann, Michael J. Madison, John H. Matheson, David Millon,
Gregory Mitchell, and Stephen B. Presser, as well as conference participants from New Views of
CorporateSeparateness at Vanderbilt University Law School, for their comments and suggestions.
Robert B. Thompson, Lee C. Hodge and Andrew B. Sachs, and Rich McPherson and Nader Raja all
deserve special thanks for generously answering questions about their studies' methodologies in the
best spirit of academic inquiry. And I am extremely grateful for invaluable research and statistical
assistance from Scotland M. Duncan (Pitt Law '09), as well as extraordinary reference support from
Marc Silverman, Barco Law Library, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.J.D., The University
of Chicago.
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Introduction
The origins of corporate veil-piercing are unknown.' This is perhaps
because the limitation on shareholder liability has never been absolute. 2 For
as long as limited liability has existed, courts have disregarded the form of
malfeasant corporate entities to access a shareholder's own assets.3 With
characteristic flair, I. Maurice Wormser once declared that "[t]he refusal of
the courts to allow quiddits and quillets to stand in the way of justice is nowhere better exemplified" than by veil-piercing, "Our Lady of the Common
Law." 4
Unfortunately, in this venue, Lady Justice measures with metaphors. At
the turn of the twentieth century, courts began borrowing from agency law
the imagery of a corporate "alter ego" 5 and "instrumentality" 6 to adjudicate
veil-piercing claims. The migration, and subsequent mutation,7 of such

1. See, e.g., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL § 1:3, at 1-12 (2004)
("There is some authority ... for suggesting that the doctrine that shareholders of corporations were
not normally responsible for the corporation's debts found its way into American common law
immediately after the Revolution. The precise reach of corporate shareholder limited liability in the
early United States is, however, uncertain.").
2. The genesis of American limited liability, like its flip side, is subject to interpretive debate.
See, e.g., EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860, at 84-93
(1954) (suggesting that support for the idea of imposing unlimited liability on shareholders in
certain situations existed as early as the 1830s in England and America); Phillip I. Blumberg,
Limited Liability and Corporate Groups, 11 J. CORP. L. 573, 587-95 (1986) (contending that
"acceptance was far from inevitable" for the idea of limiting liability of shareholders, which thus
was not perceived always as an essential principle of American corporate law); Roger E. Meiners et
al., Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 351, 362 (1979) (arguing that the
advent of limited liability did not impact immediately the number of incorporations). But see
PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:3, at 1-17 (arguing that Blumberg's interpretation of Dodd "is flawed,
insofar as it minimizes the effects of limited liability on the historical development of American
industry").
3. In the United States, "the cradle of piercing of the corporate veil doctrines," KAREN
VANDEKERCKHOVE, PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 76 (2007), the earliest general shareholder
liability statute preceded the earliest judicial reference to veil-piercing by a mere twelve days.
Compare Act of Mar. 3, 1809, ch. 65, § 6, 1809 Mass. Acts 464, 466 (requiring officers of
manufacturing corporations to pay judgments against their corporation when the corporation lacks
sufficient property to pay the judgment), with Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61,
75 (1809) (referring to a saying that "you may raise the veil which the corporate name interposes"
in an opinion dated March 15, 1809).
4. I. MAURICE WORMSER, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED
CORPORATION PROBLEMS 40, 44 (1927).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 253 (E.D. Wis.
1905) (describing a firm as the "alter ego" of a "dummy" corporation); Cheeney v. Ocean S.S. Co.,
19 S.E. 33, 35 (Ga. 1893) (describing an agent as an "alter ego").
6. HARRY G. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 146, at 250 n.2 (2d ed. 1970).
7. Litigants seeking to pierce the veil have had to establish that a corporate defendant was, inter
alia, a(n) "adjunct," "agent," "alias," "alter ego," "alter idem," "arm," "blind," "branch," "buffer,"
"cloak," "coat," "cover," "creature," "curious reminiscence," "delusion," "department," "double,"
"dry shell," "dummy," "fiction," "form," "instrumentality," "mouthpiece," "name," "nominal
identity," "phrase," "puppet," "screen," "sham," "simulacrum," "snare," "stooge," "subterfuge,"
"tool," id., "conduit," Edwards Co. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 700 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir. 1983),
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imagery eventually prompted Justice Cardozo to issue his now famous
functionalist caution that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."'
Cardozo's fear has proven to be prophetic. To beat the metaphorical
veil of limited liability, courts slavishly continue to demand metaphorical
proof.9 The most common veil-piercing test requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that a corporation was an "alter ego" or "mere instrumentality," as
evidenced by complete control and domination, of a shareholder used to perpetuate a fraud, wrong, or injustice that has proximately caused unjust loss or
Quite aptly, veil-piercing has been called
injury to the plaintiff.o
"jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet.""
The inherent imprecision in metaphors has resulted in a doctrinal mess.
Courts have resorted to compiling ever-expanding lists of ex post factspecific factors, no one of which is dispositive or necessarily connected to
the underlying harm.12 And these factors have inflicted damage in collateral
contexts. Veil-piercing tests have been assimilated to unincorporated business entities, such as the limited liability company (LLC) and limited liability
partnership (LLP).13 Veil-piercing tests also have been transmitted to

"curtain," Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir. 1991), "device," Morris v. N.Y.
State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 623 N.E.2d 1157, 1161 (N.Y. 1993), "marionette," InSITE Servs.
Corp. v. Am. Elec. Power Co. (In re InSITE Servs. Corp.), 287 B.R. 79, 97 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002),
"monkey's paw," People v. Clauson, 41 Cal. Rptr. 691, 694 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964),
"paraphernalia," Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 F.2d 265, 267 (2d Cir.
1929), "shell," Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 814 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962), or "umbilication," Berger v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 453 F.2d 991, 996 (5th Cir.
1972), of a controlling shareholder.
8. Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926). Ironically, Cardozo's eloquence

obscured, if not undermined, his own attempt to analyze and fix the doctrine. See PRESSER, supra
note 1, § 1:4, at 1-21, 1-24 ("Shrouding his own analysis irretrievably in the mists of metaphor,"
Cardozo's "ringing phrases, when analyzed, yield little of substance"); infra note 204 and
accompanying text; cf FAST TIMES AT RIDGEMONT HIGH (Refugee Films 1982) ("Relax, all right?
My old man['s] . . . got this ultimate set of tools. I can fix it." (Jeff Spicoli, played by Sean Penn)).
9. Cf Fred S. McChesney, Contractarianism Without Contracts? Yet Another Critique of
Eisenberg, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1332, 1336 (1990) ("[I]t takes a model to beat a model." (citing
GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 7 (4th ed. 1987))).
10. See, e.g., FREDERICK J. POWELL, PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF
A PARENT CORPORATION FOR THE OBLIGATIONS OF ITS SUBSIDIARY § 3 (1931) (denoting a threeelement test for piercing the corporate veil). Another approach has been to cull from Powell a
checklist of factors. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:6, at 1-30 to 1-34 (detailing a list of
questions taken from Powell's work to ask to determine whether to pierce the corporate veil); infra
note 12 and accompanying text.
I1. PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS INTHE
LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS § 1.02, at 8 (1983).
12. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 813-15 (listing twenty factors); Cathy S.
Krendl & James R. Krendl, Piercingthe Corporate Veil: Focusingthe Inquiry, 55 DENV. L.J. 1, 5255 (1978) (listing thirty-one factors, none of which is necessarily "a logical or preferable measure"

for veil-piercing).
13. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, The Limits of Liability in the New Limited Liability Entities,
32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 7 (1997) ("[W]e can expect a regular flow of cases seeking to pierce
the veil of these new limited liability entities addressed to closely held businesses.").
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extracorporate areas of the law, including agriculture, antitrust, arbitration,
bankruptcy, civil procedure, criminal, discrimination, employment,
environmental, estate and trust, family, pension, tax, and workers'
compensation.14 Not surprisingly, veil-piercing has been decried as an
"intellectually disturbing" 5 and "incoherent"' 6 doctrine whose "ambiguity
and randomness" 7 resembles "lightning, [in that] it is rare, severe, and
unprincipled."' 8 There even has been a coincidental chorus to eliminate the
doctrine altogether.' 9
Moreover, our understanding of veil-piercing has been complicated by
empirical analysis. Almost two decades ago, Robert Thompson conducted a
pioneering content analysis of approximately 1,600 federal and state veilpiercing cases. 20 Despite the oft-expressed judicial presumption respecting
14. See infra notes 123-32 and accompanying text. For an example of veil-piercing tests being
transmitted to criminal law as well as estate and trust law, see Exparte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257,
260 (Tex. 1995) (holding that a corporate officer or director can be guilty of criminal contempt even
though a court's order is directed solely at the corporation and not the officer or director), and
Henry I. Siegel Co. v. Holliday, 663 S.W.2d 824, 827 (Tex. 1984) (analogizing the role of a board
of directors to the role of trustees when directors transfer property of the corporation to directors of
the corporation).
15. ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 38 (1986).
16. David Millon, Piercing the Corporate Veil, FinancialResponsibility, and the Limits of
Limited Liability, 56 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1381 (2007).
17. Allied Capital Corp. v. GC-Sun Holdings, 910 A.2d 1020, 1042 (Del. Ch. 2006).
18. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U.
CHi. L. REV. 89, 89 (1985).
19. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing,26 J. CORP. L. 479 (2001);
Douglas C. Michael, To Know a Veil, 26 J. CORP. L. 41 (2000) (both advocating the elimination of
the veil-piercing doctrine). Less radical are numerous proposals to codify the veil-piercing test.
See, e.g., Rebecca J. Huss, Revamping Veil Piercingfor All Limited Liability Entities: Forcing the
Common Law Doctrine into the Statutory Age, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 95, 96 (2001) (urging
codification to "accomplish[] the goals of veil piercing in a more consistent manner"); John H.
Matheson & Raymond B. Eby, The Doctrine of Piercing the Veil in an Era of Multiple Limited
Liability Entities: An Opportunity to Codify the Test for Waiving Owners' Limited-Liability
Protection, 75 WASH. L. REV. 147, 152 (2000) (stressing the necessity of "eliminating free-form
decisionmaking" in favor of codification). A century ago, though, Wormser dismissed such
codification efforts as "not only impossible but preposterous." WORMSER, supra note 4, at 37-38.
Nevertheless, there have been some legislative attempts to control veil-piercing. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(e) (West 2009) ("The failure of a close corporation to observe corporate
formalities relating to meetings of directors or shareholders in connection with the management of
its affairs ... shall not be considered a factor tending to establish that the shareholders have
personal liability for corporate obligations."); WIS. STAT. § 180.1835 (2009) ("The failure of a
statutory close corporation to observe usual corporate formalities or requirements relating to the
exercise of its corporate powers or the management of its business and affairs is not grounds for
imposing personal liability on the shareholders for obligations of the corporation."); infra note 35
and accompanying text. The Model Business Corporation Act, for instance, provides that "a
shareholder of a corporation is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation except
that he may become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct." MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT § 6.22(b) (2002); see also id. § 7.32(f) (providing that a shareholder agreement "shall not be a
ground for imposing personal liability on any shareholder ... even if the agreement or its
performance ... results in failure to observe ... corporate formalities").
20. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 CORNELL L.
REV. 1036, 1044 (1991) [hereinafter Thompson, Empirical Piercing]; see also Robert B.
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the separation between a corporation and its shareholders, 2 1 Thompson found
that veil-piercing claims succeeded 40.18% of the time, and exclusively
against close corporations.22 Further, not only did veil-piercing occur far less
often against corporate parents than individual shareholders, 23 but success
was not highly correlated with evidence of shareholder domination, a failure
to observe corporate formalities-such as conducting meetings or keeping
records-or inadequate capitalization. 24 Most notably, Thompson found that
veil-piercing claims arose and prevailed more often in Contract than Tort.2 5
These results project a broad chasm between the theory and practice of
veil-piercing. That litigants apparently enjoy far more success against individual shareholders belies a diverse collection of arguments and predictions
about veil-piercing being more compelling against corporate groups. 2 6 Similarly confounding is the apparently weak relationship between a decision to
pierce and evidence of domination or a failure to observe formalities, 27 as
well as inadequate capitalization, particularly for claims in Tort.2 8
But it is the asymmetrical result between Contract and Tort that has
become one of corporate law's most notorious, counterintuitive puzzles. For
almost as long as veil-piercing has existed, commentators have distinguished

Thompson, Piercing the Veil Within CorporateGroups: CorporateShareholdersas Mere Investors,

13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 379, 380 & n.4 (1999) [hereinafter Thompson, Group Piercing] (providing a
limited update on ten additional years of cases).
21. See, e.g., Kashfi v. Phibro-Salomon, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 727, 732-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
("Courts are reluctant to disregard the separate existence of related corporations by piercing the
corporate veil, and have consistently given substantial weight to the 'presumption of separateness."'
(citations omitted)); EnduraCare Therapy Mgmt. v. Drake, 681 S.E.2d 168, 171 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)
(maintaining the presumption of separation in the absence of sufficient allegations within the
complaint).
22. Thompson, Empirical Piercing,supra note 20, at 1047-48 & tbl. 1.
23. Id. at 1056.
24. Id. at 1063 tbl.11.
25. Id. at 1058. Substantive claims have been capitalized to distinguish them from factors
within the veil-piercing test.
26. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 110-11 ("Courts' greater willingness to
allow creditors to reach the assets of corporate as opposed to personal shareholders is ... consistent
with economic principles."); Jonathan M. Landers, A Unified Approach to Parent, Subsidiary, and

Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 589, 623 (1975) ("[C]ourts may have a greater
proclivity to reach corporate, as opposed to individual, stockholders."); infra notes 168-69, 172-73
and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., David H. Barber, Piercing the Corporate Veil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 371,

377-78 (1981) ("Courts nearly always cite disregard of corporate formalities as one prong of the
test used to determine when the veil should be pierced.. . . The intent behind the formalities prong
of the piercing test ... is to prevent shareholder-owners from impairing the interests of other parties
by carrying this unity of interest too far.").
28. See, e.g., William P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, Shareholder Liabilityfor Inadequate

Capital,43 U. PITr. L. REV. 837, 867 (1982) ("The courts seem more inclined to hold shareholders
liable for the torts of their corporations than for their contracts when ... inadequate capitalization is
present, and the textwriters generally support this position."); infra notes 101-06 and accompanying
text.
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between claims grounded in Contract versus Tort.29 That distinction is commonly recast as one between voluntary and involuntary creditors, but the
fulcrum remains constant: "Contract creditors ... are compensated ex ante
for the increased risk of default ex post. Tort creditors, by contrast, are not
compensated." 30 The inability of involuntary creditors to bargain or insure
themselves against risk has led "almost every commentator" to conclude that
veil-piercing is more compelling in Tort than Contract.3 1
Indeed, prior to Thompson's study, there had been numerous
observations to this effect. Commentators believed veil-piercing claims were
being adjudicated correctly, citing impressionistic evidence that courts were
generally "more likely to disregard the corporate entity in [T]ort cases than in
[C]ontract cases." 32 This claim, in turn, started to permeate actual judicial
reasoning.33 And after a controversial decision by its supreme court,34 Texas
even amended its business-corporation statute with a stiffer standard for veilpiercing claims couched in Contract.
All of this was thrown into a lurch by Thompson's findings. According
to Thompson, the infrequency of claims in Tort "suggests that piercing law is
rooted in concerns of inequitable bargains."36 But even he is pressed to explain the disparity in veil-piercing rates, merely observing that "[T]ort
settings seem to involve different concerns than [C]ontracts cases," or that
some exogenous factors may be at work. As he simply acknowledged, the

29. See, e.g., William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through
Subsidiary Corporations,39 YALE L.J. 193, 195 (1929) (bifurcating their analysis of veil-piercing
cases into claims in Contract versus Tort).
30. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112.
31. See 2 PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG ET AL., BLUMBERG ON CORPORATE GROUPS § 57.04, at 57-8
(2d ed. 2010) ("[V]ery special pressures in [T]ort law require a treatment different from that in
[veil-piercing] cases arising in other areas of law, such as [C]ontract."); David W. Leebron, Limited
Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1601 (1991) ("[A]lmost every
commentator has paused to note that limited liability cannot be satisfactorily justified for [T]ort
victims. . . ."); infra note 91 and accompanying text.
32. 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 41.85, at 269-70 (rev. vol. 2006); see also Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18,
at 112 ("Courts are more willing to disregard the corporate veil in [T]ort than in [C]ontract cases.").
33. See, e.g., Cascade Energy & Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1577 (10th Cir. 1990)
("[T]he analysis of corporate veil issues is different in a consensual transaction, such as a breach of
contract case, than in a nonconsensual transaction, such as many tort cases . . . ."); Gray v.
Edgewater Landing, 541 So. 2d 1044, 1046 (Miss. 1989) ("Since [C]ontract liability arises from an
essentially consensual relationship, courts generally decline to disregard the corporate entity .... ).
34. See Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. 1986) (permitting veil-piercing
merely upon proof of constructive fraud).
35. See Willis v. Donnelly, 199 S.W.3d 262, 272 n.12 (Tex. 2006) ("In response to Castleberry,
Article 2.21 of the [Texas Business Corporation Act] was amended in 1989 to establish a clear
legislative standard .. . [for] the liability of a shareholder .. . in the context of contractual
obligations.. . ." (citing TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.21 cmt. (West 2003))).
36. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1068.
37. Id. at 1069; see also infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
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inexplicable results, "more than any other in the project, go against the conventional wisdom."
That was almost two decades ago. The results now "appear to be on
their way to becoming the conventional wisdom." 3 9 Despite Thompson's
caution,4 0 courts cite his study in adjudicating veil-piercing claims.4 1 States
utilize his results to attract potential incorporators,4 2 and lawyers rely on his
findings in providing business guidance.43 Further, his methodology has
been replicated in empirical studies of veil-piercing around the world." The
incontrovertible fact is that Thompson's study has influenced how we perceive and engage the doctrine.
Yet to this day, no one has explained the dominance of veil-piercing in
Contract over Tort. Some interpret Thompson's findings as evidence of a
predisposition toward using Contract as a substantive vehicle for veilpiercing.45 Others regard the findings as "simply illustrat[ing] how badly the
courts have been handling piercing cases,"4 6 and thus "yet another black
mark against" the doctrine. 47 And one commentator even "cling[s] to the
economists' notion that the veil is more likely to be pierced in [T]ort than in
[C]ontract cases." 4 8 With veil-piercing, people seem to see what they want to
see.

38. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1058.

39. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-36 n.5; see also infra note 73 and accompanying text.
40. See Thompson, Group Piercing,supra note 20, at 392 ("I would discourage devoting too
much attention to whether corporate law conflicts with [T]ort law . . . ."). But see infra notes 89-92
and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 724 (2004); Theberge v.
Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Me. 1996); Garcia v. Coffman, 946 P.2d 216, 227 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1997) (all referencing Thompson's veil-piercing study).
42. See, e.g., Nevada v. California,CORPORATE SERV. CTR., http://corporateservicecenter.com/

nevada-california-comparison.html (claiming that "Nevada provides a much stronger corporate
veil" by citing Thompson's finding that, "among the states with the largest number of reported veil
piercing decisions, California courts pierce the corporate veil at the highest rate-45% of attempted
veil piercing cases in California are successful").
43. See, e.g., John Wootton, CorporationOwner's Survival Guide, EMPOWEREDWEALTH.COM

1, http://www.empoweredwealth.com/documents/WoottonSurvivalGuideReport_000.pdf ("What's
more, over 50 percent of the time, you will lose your protection and the court will hold you
personally liable." (citing Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055)). Contra
Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1054-55 & tbl.7 (noting that "[a]mong close
corporations, those with only one shareholder were pierced in almost 50% of the cases" and
reporting a 49.64% veil-piercing rate in that specific context).
44. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Contract-Centered Veil Piercing, 13 STAN. J.L.

Bus. & FIN. 121, 127 (2007) ("[Clourts and litigants demonstrate a bias in favor of piercing in
[C]ontract disputes compared to [T]ort disputes. In part, this bias is evidenced in the research of
Professor Robert Thompson. . . ."); infra note 73.
46. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion
Surroundingthe Doctrine ofPiercing the CorporateVeil, 76 OR. L. REv. 853, 859 (1997).

47. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 512 n.159.
48. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 n.5.
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Or perhaps what they see is simply incomplete. The controversy about
the empirics of veil-piercing, particularly in Contract and Tort, may be akin
to the classic fable about the disagreement among a group of blind men over
their perception of an elephant. 4 9 In this case the elephant in the room is not
veil-piercing but its long-suspected accessory: Fraud. The omission of this
claim from Thompson's study, as well as its progeny, is crucial in light of
Fraud's substantively hybrid nature;50 certain species of Fraud, for instance,
can be characterized as a Contract or Tort, or have been regarded by some as
a complete substitute for Contract claims. 5' But there has been no investigation into, much less speculation about, whether seepage of Fraud into
Contract or Tort could explain the wayward path apparently being taken by
courts.
The present study charts a different course. An entirely new dataset is
constructed from 1658 up to and including 2006, thus adding twenty-one
years to the time frame originally examined by Thompson. 52 This dataset is
not only bigger, but broader, as more expansive search terms were used in
Westlaw, whose database coverage has become more complete in the two
decades since Thompson's study was published. The initial yield of 15,188
cases approximately doubles the number that Thompson's terms would have
obtained over the same time frame; 54 after exclusions are applied, the final
dataset of 2,908 federal and state cases presents the most comprehensive empirical portrait of veil-piercing decisions yet. 5 Moreover, the present study
substantially revises and refines Thompson's methodology. For the first time
the dynamics of veil-piercing in Fraud are revealed,56 and data were collected
for specific subclaims in Contract, Tort, and Fraud to provide not only a finegrained portrait of different types of actions, but also insight into the distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors.
And the rationes
decidendi of veil-piercing cases are examined to discern how veil-piercing
claims are being adjudicated.
The results largely confirm our legal intuitions about veil-piercing.
Federal and state courts pierce almost 50% of the time and only the veil of
close corporations whose potential for consolidated shareholding permits a

49. See generally MASNAVI I MA'NAVI, TEACHINGS OF RUI

122-26 (E.H. Whinfield trans.,

Octagon Press 1994) ("The eye of outward sense is as the palm of a hand,/The whole of the object is
not grasped in the palm."); JOHN GODFREY SAXE, POEMS 259-61 (1868) ("And so these men of
Indostan/Disputed loud and long,/Each in his own opinion/Exceeding stiff and strong,/Though each
was partly in the right/And all were in the wrong!").
50. See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 81, 87 and accompanying text.
52. This is not an arbitrary time frame. See infra notes 111, 113 and accompanying text.
53. See infra note 143.

54. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
55. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 49-51; infra text accompanying notes 80-100.
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requisite finding of control or domination.5 7 As expected, the most successful civil veil-piercing claims are grounded in Fraud or supported by specific
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. Moreover, veil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than Contract, reversing the counterintuitive
asymmetry found by Thompson's study; the superiority of veil-piercing rates
in Tort over Contract not only holds but expands when those claims are recast into claims between involuntary and voluntary creditors. Although not
as sharp as expected, the disparity in rates for these distinctions squares with
what commentators, courts, and practitioners have long believed but thus far
Similarly, quite predictable suspects comprise the
been unable to prove.
most common instrumental rationales: commingling, control or domination,
injustice or unfairness, fraud or misrepresentation, and inadequate
capitalization. Somewhat surprisingly, though, evidence of inadequate
capitalization is comparably frequent and instrumental in Contract, Tort, and
Fraud claims; quite unexpectedly, the relative sophistication of bargaining
parties yields no appreciable difference in veil-piercing success, while courts
reach more often into the assets of individual shareholders than corporate
groups.
Part I reviews Thompson's methodology before delineating the
hypotheses and methodology of the present study. Part II then systematically
presents the study's results from the perspective of the types of courts, the
state law applied, the types of substantive claims, and the rationales instrumental to a decision whether to pierce; Part II concludes by reexamining all
of these results in terms of voluntary and involuntary creditors.
I.

Methodology

Veil-piercing is misdubbed the most litigated issue in corporate law.
But as the primary exception to limited liability, the doctrine is a staple of

57. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 88-92.
59. Contra Robert B. Thompson, Agency Law and Asset Partitioning, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1321,

1325 (2003); Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036; Thompson, supra note 13, at
1; Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. REV.

619, 619 (2005) [hereinafter Thompson, Common Law Piercing] (all describing piercing the veil as
"the most litigated issue in corporate law"). This proposition, which is based on searches
Thompson conducted in Lexis and Westlaw with the same terms used in his study versus terms such
as "corporate takeover" and "hostile takeover," has been cited by numerous courts, academics, and
practitioners. See, e.g., Coltec Indus., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716, 741 (2004)
("'[P]iercing claims constitute the single most litigated area in corporate law . . . .' (alteration in
original) (emphasis removed) (quoting FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW § 1.5, at 70
(2000))); Darrell D. Dorrell & Gregory A. Gadawski, Counterterrorism: Conventional Tools for
Unconventional Warfare, U.S. ATYS' BULL., Mar. 2005, at 1, 2, available at http://www.justice.

gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usab5302.pdf; Stephen B. Presser, Commentary, Thwarting the
Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 148,

154 n.21 (1992) (both stating that "'[pliercing the corporate veil is the most litigated issue in
corporate law"' (quoting Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036)). Searches using
Westlaw's Key Search Topics prior to 1986 and to the present, however, reveal that references to
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corporate law that impacts virtually every aspect of business planning. 60 And
our empirical knowledge of veil-piercing has been shaped indelibly by
Robert Thompson's landmark study, which occupies a prominent place
within any discussion of the doctrine. Cited in hundreds of articles, briefs,
61
and opinions, the study has spawned numerous derivative studies in the
United States and around the world.62
However sincere, methodological imitation is not necessarily a form of
flattery. Thus far, the critical spotlight has focused almost exclusively on the
results, and not the methodology, of Thompson's study. This Part redirects
the spotlight, examining that study's design before proceeding to advance
some hypotheses and then to delineate the present study's methodology.
Part I concludes with some cautionary notes about the limits of both studies.
A. Thompson's Methodological Tree
Thompson's study actually covers two time frames. His original dataset
contained approximately 1,600 veil-piercing cases in Westlaw, up to and including 1985;63 Thompson subsequently expanded the dataset with an
additional 2,200 cases from 1986 up to and including 1996.64 The update
yielded results consistent with the original findings: 65
1. Courts pierced the corporate veil in approximately 40% of
all reported cases;
2. Piercing ... is a doctrine directed exclusively at close
corporations and corporate groups .. .;

numerous claims, including "Liabilities of Officers and Directors" ((TO(101x(c)) (TO(101x(d))) /p
Liab!) (101k653 /p (officer director))) and "Dissolution" (TO(l0lx(v))), all yield more hits than
Thompson's search terms. See Scotland M. Duncan, Lifting the Veil of Misconception About the
Most Litigated Issue in Corporate Law 18 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)
(noting that from 1986 to 2008, Key Search references to veil-piercing increased more than any
other topic with at least 3,000 hits).
60. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 59, § 1.5, at 70 (describing veil-piercing as "the area of
corporation law which the attorney seeking to avoid corporate practice is most likely to confront");
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 89 ("Limited liability is a fundamental principle of
corporate law."); Leebron, supra note 31, at 1566 ("No principle seems more established in
capitalist law or more essential to the functioning of the modern corporate economy [than limited
liability]."); Robert B. Thompson, The Basic Business Associations Course: An Empirical Study of

Methods and Content, 48 J.LEGAL EDUC. 438, 440 fig.1 (1998) (reporting veil-piercing as the only
topic taught by all seventy-one Business Associations/Corporations professors responding to a
survey).
61. A search of ((Robert /2 Thompson) /s ("Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study"))
in Westlaw's ALLCASES, BRIEF-ALL, and TP-ALL databases yielded 245 hits.
62. See infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
64. See Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385 ("A preliminary examination of the
recent data indicates that these results fit within the pattern of the original study."). But see infra
text accompanying note 164. The 2,200 cases apparently comprise the initial yield and not the final
dataset. By comparison there were only 802 cases in this study's final dataset from 1986 up to and
including 1996.
65. Thompson, GroupPiercing,supra note 20, at 385.
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3. Courts pierce the veil more often to get to an individual
who is a shareholder [43.13%, 786 cases] than to reach
another corporation who is a shareholder [37.21%, 637
cases] .

.

. [;]

4.

Courts are less likely to pierce the veil in cases involving
[T]ort claims [30.97%, 226 cases] as opposed to those
involving [C]ontractual [41.98%, 779 cases] or [S]tatutory
claims [40.58%, 552 cases] .. .;
5. Undercapitalization [53.22%, 171 cases] and corporate
informalities [46.46%, 226 cases] often lead to piercing,
but appear in a relatively small percentage of all cases in
which courts pierce and an even smaller number of the
[T]ort cases.66
Moreover, "even if we eliminate[d] the [M]isrepresentation cases from the
[C]ontracts group, the piercing results [would] still remain higher in
[C]ontract cases."67 According to Thompson, these results suggest that, for
close corporations, veil-piercing is "strongly rooted in the bargain setting," 68
and that "courts interfere when there has been wrongful conduct by the proprietor that inappropriately changes the bargain the parties struck." 69
For both time frames, Thompson utilized the same methodology.70
Combinations of two search terms, "piercing the corporate veil" and
"disregard! the corporate entity," as well as four unidentified Key Numbers
were run in Westlaw. 7 1 A team of law students then collected data on a
decision's year, the court's jurisdiction and type, the type of plaintiff and
defendant, the number and type of shareholders, the substantive claims connected to veil-piercing, the frequency with which eighty-five possible
rationales were mentioned in all cases, and the court's ultimate decision
whether to pierce.72
Thompson's study has served as the methodological foundation for all
subsequent empirical studies of corporate disregard. In the United States,
pairs of Wake Forest law students have sampled the last twenty years of veilpiercing cases in Westlaw, and "[b]ecause [their] method was intended to
mirror Professor Thompson's, [they] closely followed his methodology."

66. Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted). The bracketed figures come from Thompson, Empirical
Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7, 1058 tbl.9; see also Thompson, supra note 13, at 9 ("After
additional analysis of that data base, I can make a broader statement. Piercing occurs only within
corporate groups or in close corporations with fewer than ten shareholders.").
67. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1069.
68. Id. at 1071.
69. Thompson, Common Law Piercing, supra note 59, at 629.
70. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044-47, with Thompson,
Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 385-88.
71. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1036 n. 1.

72. Id. at 1044 & n.48.
73. Lee C. Hodge & Andrew B. Sachs, Empirical Study, Piercing the Mist: Bringing the
Thompson Study into the 1990s, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 341, 347 (2008) (analyzing 228 cases

2010]

Veil-Piercing

93

Thompson's methodology also has been replicated by Australian and British
studies, both of which incidentally find a similar asymmetry for Contract
over Tort.74
Far less prevalent, though, has been any critical reflection on
Thompson's methodology.75 His study presents the frequency of and success

from 1986 to 1995); see also Rich McPherson & Nader Raja, Corporate Justice: An Empirical
Study of Piercing Rates and Factors Courts Consider When Piercing the Corporate Veil 12 (2009)
(unpublished note) (on file with author) (examining 236 cases from 1996 to 2005). Both studies
sampled one-sixth of all cases and found that the overall veil-piercing rate apparently declined. See
Hodge & Sachs, supra, at 347, 349-50 (analyzing 483 cases out of 2,901 returned in the initial
search and "showing an increasing reluctance of courts to pierce the corporate veil"); McPherson &
Raja, supra, at 12 (analyzing every sixth case arranged chronologically to create a sample of 638
cases from an initial yield of 3,821 cases). Notably, Hodge and Sachs's sample found that veilpiercing claims prevail more often in Tort (35.71%) than Contract (31.11%). Hodge & Sachs,
supra, at 354 tbl.8; see also PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 n.5 ("The review of the cases that
I did in preparing this treatise for publication in 1991, particularly with regard to cases decided
since 1985, the end of the Thompson study period, does suggest that the idea that courts ought to
pierce less frequently in [C]ontract cases is gaining ground."). But see infra note 244 and
accompanying text. McPherson and Raja's sample, however, found that veil-piercing claims
prevail more often in Contract (30.70%) than Tort (15.00%). McPherson & Raja, supra, at 21
tbl. 10.
Another corporate veil-piercing study drawing on Thompson's methodology is by Nicholas
Georgakopoulos. His study simply examines Westlaw Key Number references to veil-piercing in
Contract and Tort, from 1947 up to and including 2003, to generate a prediction about the frequency
Georgakopoulos, supra note 45, at 127-28.
with which litigants pursue these claims.
Georgakopoulos's study, however, does not involve any coding and, by extension, any veil-piercing
rates. Moreover, his study is highly vulnerable to false positives because of the remedial nature of
veil-piercing and evidence suggesting asymmetrical settlement rates in Tort versus Contract. See
infra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text.
Thompson's study also has served as a methodological template for empirical studies
examining specific applications and arguable extensions of veil-piercing. See generally John H.
Matheson, The Modern Law of Corporate Groups: An EmpiricalStudy of Piercing the Corporate
Veil in the Parent-Subsidiary Context, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1091 (2009) (examining 360 parent-

subsidiary cases from January 1, 1990, to March 1, 2008); Fred S. McChesney, DoctrinalAnalysis
and Statistical Modeling in Law: The Case of Defective Incorporation, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 493

(1993) (examining 102 defective incorporation cases from 1818 to 1945); Geoffrey Christopher
Rapp, Preserving LLC Veil Piercing: A Response to Bainbridge, 31 J. CORP. L. 1063 (2006)

(examining sixty-one LLC veil-piercing cases up to and including 2005).

But see Timothy R.

Wyatt, Note, The Doctrine of Defective Incorporationand Its Tenuous Coexistence with the Model

Business CorporationAct, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 833, 847-51 (2009) (criticizing McChesney's
conclusion that defective incorporation is a subset of veil-piercing).
74. See Charles Mitchell, Lifting the Corporate Veil in the English Courts:An EmpiricalStudy,
3 COMPANY FIN. & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 15, 18 (1999) (examining 290 British cases from 1888 up

to and including 1998 with a methodology that "was inspired by the example of two similar studies
which have been undertaken, one of a large group of American cases, the other of a smaller group
of Australian cases"); Ian M. Ramsay & David B. Noakes, Piercing the CorporateVeil in Australia,
19 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 250 (2001) (examining 104 Australian cases up to and including 1999).
But see generally Peter B. Oh, Piercing v. Lifting 1, 8-10 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author) (examining 188 British cases from 1888 up to and including 2006 with the same
methodology used here and finding, inter alia, corporate-disregard claims prevail more often in Tort
than Contract).
75. Ramsay and Noakes have made one of the few substantive refinements in all subsequent
empirical veil-piercing studies, which is to code cases for claims on a nonexclusive basis. See
Ramsay & Noakes, supra note 74, at 264 ("There are 109 cases listed, more than the overall study,
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rates for veil-piercing within four substantive claims: Contract, Criminal,
Statute, and Tort.76 But the total number of claims is less than the total number of cases, which indicates that none of the cases contained multiple claims
or that they were reduced subjectively to just one type of claim.7 Similarly,
the number of defendant shareholders is dramatically less than the total number of cases, despite the possibility that there may be bundled claims against
corporate groups and individuals.7 8 Further, his study presents only the frequency with which a rationale is mentioned in cases and the extent to which

as in some cases the piercing argument was made in more than one context."). One criticism of
Thompson's study is that the results are not replicable. See David S. Goldman, Legal Construct
Validation: Expanding EmpiricalLegal Scholarship to Unobservable Concepts, 36 CAP. U. L. REV.

79, 123 (2007) ("While [Thompson's] article precisely describes the specific searches conducted, it
does not completely explain how the results were filtered."). Thompson actually does not specify
the four Key Numbers used in connection with his search terms, see infra note 114, and he does not
provide complete results for combinations of variables, such as the veil-piercing rate for claims and
rationales. See, e.g., infra note 209 and accompanying text.
Another set of criticisms has been advanced by Fred McChesney:
[T]he rethinking ... carried forward by Thompson is not wholly satisfactory
methodologically. Merely counting cases and sorting them into various pigeonholes
according to expressed judicial rationales . . . suffers from at least two deficiencies....
First, the stated reasons for judges' holdings may not always explain the complete
rationale for their decisions....
Second, courts typically designate more than one factor as relevant or important in
the ultimate decision, rather than expound a bright-line, single-factor rule.
McChesney, supra note 73, at 515. With respect to the second concern, McChesney's constructive
suggestion is to use multiple regression, "a statistical technique that can solve the problems of
calculating the influence of individual case factors, identifying their relative weights, and
accounting for the simultaneous presence of different factors." Id. at 519; see also id. at 515 n.82
("Thompson is aware of the methodological shortcomings of merely sorting cases, and reports that
he is at work on a multiple regression model for the veil-piercing cases."). This suggestion has been
applied productively by John Matheson's recent study of veil-piercing in corporate groups, which
notes that "[a]though Thompson recognized the need for a more sophisticated 'logit analysis, a form
of statistical regression analysis,' the supposed 'model and the results' have never been reported."
Matheson, supra note 73, at 1106 n.48 (quoting Thompson, Empirical Piercing,supra note 20, at
1046 n.62). Thompson actually did perform regression analysis but limited it to statistical
differences and presented it on a selective basis. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at
1049 nn.77-79, 1052 nn.83 & 87, 1055 n.100, 1057 nn.111 & 114, 1058 n.116. Only summary
statistics are presented here, as regression analysis will be part of a future project. As for
McChesney's concerns about judicial rationales, this study focuses on a case's rationes decidendi
rather than their mere mention. See infra subpart II(D). Some of his functionalist concerns are
addressed here, but there are unavoidable selection effects that apply not only to this study, but also
to Matheson's and McChesney's. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
76. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1044.

77. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1058 tbl.9 (reporting 1,572
Contract, Tort, Criminal, and Statute cases), with id. at 1048 tbl.1 (reporting 1,583 cases), id. at
1049 tbl.2 (reporting a total of 1,585 cases over time), and id. at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting 1,577 cases
by court); compare also Thompson, Group Piercing, supra note 20, at 386 tbl.2 (reporting 445
Contract, Tort, and Statute cases), with id. at 386 tbl. 1 (reporting 547 corporate-group cases).
78. Compare Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7 (reporting 1,423
shareholders), with id. at 1048 tbl.1 (reporting 1,583 cases), id. at 1049 tbl.2 (reporting 1,585 cases
over time), and id. at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting 1,577 cases by court). Thompson presented results for
only corporate and individual shareholders, but even the addition of governmental owners seems
unlikely to account for the difference.
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the rationale's absence or presence coincides with decisions to pierce;
although useful, those data do not reflect whether a particular rationale's
absence or presence played a dispositive role in the court's ultimate
decision.79 Evidence of control or domination, for instance, may appear with
equal frequency in Contract and Tort claims, but its absence or presence may
serve as dicta in certain situations and a dispositive justification in others.
Moreover, Thompson's study does not recognize Fraud as a distinct
substantive claim. Instead, Fraud claims were recharacterized as Contract,
Criminal, Statute, or Tort claims on an exclusive basis.80 But the lines for
recharacterization are not always so clear. For instance, although Fraudulent
Misrepresentation claims can be characterized as either Contract or Tort,81
they frequently receive ambiguous treatment in opinions. 82 And courts frequently conflate the distinction between Contract-based warranty and Tortbased deceit claims. 83 The versatility in the characterization of Fraud claims
presents a potentially distortive effect on Thompson's findings about the frequency of and rates for veil-piercing in Contract and Tort.
Thompson's omission of Fraud is puzzling given its long-suspected role
as an accessory to veil-piercing. Stephen Presser, for instance, has observed

79. Id. at 1063 ("[T]he same reasons seem to appear in cases which pierce the veil and those
decisions which do not." (citation omitted)). Although failed and successful attempts to pierce do
mention the same four rationales with the most frequency, their proportional representation varies
substantially. For instance, more than any other rationale, the absence of fraud or misrepresentation
is mentioned in decisions not to pierce, but its presence is far less prominent in successful veilpiercing cases. Compare id. at 1063 tbl. 11, with id. at 1064 n.141.
80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Thomas C. Galligan Jr., ContortionsAlong the Boundary Between Contracts and

Torts, 69 TUL. L. REV. 457, 462-63 (1994) (identifying six considerations for deciding whether to
characterize a claim in Contract or Tort). Moreover, as is evident in conflicts of laws,
characterization can be a difficult problem. See, e.g., A. H. ROBERTSON, CHARACTERIZATION IN

THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 176-83 (1940) (examining the problem of characterization for Contract
and Tort).
82. See, e.g., Moses v. Martin, 360 F. Supp. 2d 533, 543-44 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (denying a
motion to dismiss a Fraud claim that was allegedly a restatement of a breach-of-contract claim on
the basis that the defendant owed a fiduciary duty); Ziegler v. Inabata of Am., Inc., 316 F. Supp. 2d
908, 916-17 (D. Colo. 2004) (denying a motion for summary judgment for claims based on an
ownership interest, "thereby invoking claims for breach of contract and fraudulent, or at a
minimum, negligent misrepresentation").
83. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50

MINN. L. REv. 791, 800 (1966) (characterizing warranty as a "freak hybrid born of the illicit
intercourse of [T]ort and [C]ontract"); Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contractingto Avoid
Extra-ContractualLiability-Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the "Entire" Deal?, 64

BUS. LAW. 999, 1009-10 (2009) ("Even since courts have enforced express warranties as
contractual promises, many courts have continued to recognize a separate [T]ort claim for breaches
of those express warranties to the extent that such claims also satisfy the culpability, materiality,
and reliance requirements of a [M]isrepresentation claim brought in [T]ort."). The economic-loss
doctrine represents a judicial attempt to clarify this distinction. See, e.g., United Vaccines, Inc. v.
Diamond Animal Health, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1083, 1094 (W.D. Wis. 2006) ("The economic loss
doctrine is intended to keep a party from effecting an end run around [C]ontract law to recover
under [T]ort law what it could not recover under [C]ontract law and through [C]ontract remedies."
(citation omitted)).
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that veil-piercing "often incorporates and bears a strong resemblance to
[F]raud." 84 And Robert Clark has gone so far as to argue that most veilpiercing claims may be seen as simply Fraudulent Transfers disguised.
Even Stephen Bainbridge, who despises veil-piercing, believes that "[F]raud
and [M]isrepresentation asks the right questions and seems far more likely to
lead to correct outcomes."8 6 In a similar vein, Richard Posner has suggested
that, "[s]ince [F]raud is independently actionable, one may question the need
for a doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in [C]ontract cases."
Posner's skepticism presumes that the orthodox economic distinction
between voluntary and involuntary creditors is judicially compelling.88 In
theory limited liability does not present a moral-hazard problem of externalizing risk to voluntary creditors because they can and will take optimal
precautions. 89 But when the transaction costs of precautions are prohibitively
high, the probability that a corporation will engage in risk-shifting activity
increases. 90 Imposing Tort liability compensates involuntary creditors while
also creating incentives for corporations to engage in an efficient amount of
care. 91 This distinction should be obviated only when there is fraudulent

84. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:1, at 1-7.
85. See Robert Charles Clark, The Duties of the CorporateDebtorto Its Creditors, 90 HARv. L.

REV. 505, 540-53 (1977) (excepting veil-piercing of corporations with inadequate initial
capitalization from his assertion).
86. Bainbridge, supra note 19, at 519.
87. Torco Oil Co. v. Innovative Thermal Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1445, 1451 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
(Posner, J., by designation). But see Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 31 ("Fraud cases are
difficult to prove, and the quantum of evidence available in most corporate veil cases is
considerably smaller than would be required to carry the burden on a fraud claim.").
88. But see infra note 287 and accompanying text.
89. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated Corporations,43 U. CHI.

L. REV. 499, 503 (1976) (contending that lenders will exact higher interest rates on limited liability
corporations as a risk premium); cf PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-37 to 1-38 ("Posner's veilpiercing article .. . is simply developing an argument ... already advanced by [Frederick]
Powell.").
90. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 105 ("This is a simple application of the
Coase Theorem."); id. at 104-09 (explaining that some of a firm's costs for risky activities are
shifted to involuntary creditors when high transaction costs prevent affected parties from charging
an appropriate risk premium).
91. See generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder

Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1879-81 (1991) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, Unlimited Liability] (suggesting a rule of pro rata shareholder liability for corporate
Torts); Leebron, supra note 31, at 1568-69 (arguing that the justifications for limited liability do not
apply to noncontractual creditors). Hansmann and Kraakman's suggestion has been criticized on
essentially enforcement grounds. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder
Liability Through a ProceduralLens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 388-90 (1992) (contending that

Hansmann and Kraakman's proposal would encounter too many procedural barriers and might not
be implementable); Joseph A. Grundfest, The Future of Unlimited Liability: A Capital Markets

Perspective, 102 YALE L.J. 387, 389-91 (1992) (criticizing a pro rata rule for shareholder liability
because it does not account for how capital markets actually would react to that rule). But see
generally Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, A ProceduralFocus on Unlimited Shareholder

Liability, 106 HARv. L. REV. 446 (1992) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, ProceduralFocus]
(responding to Alexander's criticisms); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Do the Capital

2010]

Veil-Piercing

97

conduct, as it impedes the ability of parties to assess accurately the optimal
level of precautions.9 2
Thompson's methodology permits only a crude assessment of this
account's validity. His study does provide limited insight into the success of
veil-piercing claims in Contract and Tort, as well as the frequency with
which courts mention rationales.93 But a more fine-grained analysis would
examine the relative sophistication of contracting parties to see whether veilpiercing truly "is rooted in concerns of inequitable bargains." 94 And one
would want to examine intentional, negligent, and quasi-contractual Torts to
see whether "[T]ort settings seem to involve different concerns than
[C]ontracts cases."
Moreover, one would want to examine the rationales that seem
instrumental to a court's ultimate decision whether to pierce. As Frank
Gevurtz has pointed out,
The question is not what sort of creditor more deserves piercing in the
abstract. Rather, the question is what specific facts justify piercing in
favor of either type of creditor. The utility of the [T]orts versus
[C]ontracts distinction is that the facts which should justify piercing
may be different when dealing with the different types of claimants. 96
Although not a prerequisite in most tests, evidence of "fraud or something
like it" is demanded by Delaware courts97 and is often given significant
weight in other jurisdictions; 98 if veil-piercing indeed concerns inequitable
bargains, Thompson has suggested that, in those settings, "the role of the
court will be similar to that in other [C]ontract contexts-has there been
fraud or some other reason why the bargain struck by the parties should not
be respected by the court?"9 9 Alternatively, if fraud or misrepresentation is
absent or insufficient, evidence of commingled assets or a failure to observe

Markets Compel Limited Liability? A Response to Professor Grundfest, 102 YALE L.J. 427 (1992)

[hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, CapitalMarkets] (rebutting Grundfest's criticisms). For an
analysis of the origins of this carve out, see Daniel R. Kahan, Note, Shareholder Liability for
CorporateTorts: A HistoricalPerspective, 97 GEO. L.J. 1085, 1102-03 (2009).
92. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 112 ("Th[e] distinction between
[C]ontract and [Tiort creditors breaks down when the debtor engages in fraud or
misrepresentation . . . [because] the creditor will not demand adequate compensation.").
93. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1063 tbl. 11, 1068-70.
94. Id. at 1068.
95. Id. at 1069.
96. Gevurtz, supra note 46, at 859.
97. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Linear Films, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 260, 268 (D. Del. 1989)
("Fraud or something like it is required." (citations omitted)).
98. See, e.g., Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 26 Cal. Rptr. 806, 813 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962) ("[W]hile the doctrine does not depend on the presence of actual fraud, it is designed
to prevent what would be fraud or injustice, if accomplished."). Not surprisingly, this requirement
has mutated. See, e.g., Kuibyshevnefteorgsynthez v. Model, Civ. A. No. 93-4919, 1995 WL 66371,
at *15 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1995) ("'[I]njustice or the like' will suffice." (citation omitted)).
99. Thompson, Common Law Piercing,supra note 59, at 622.
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basic corporate formalities might assert itself more when veil-piercing litigants succeed in Contract than in Tort. 0 0
One other rationale meriting specific attention is undercapitalization.
For years commentators and courts have debated how such evidence should
Early commentators argued that
be weighed for veil-piercing cases.
undercapitalization was a serviceable proxy for fraud or misrepresentation
that warranted veil-piercing in all contexts,101 and, despite difficulties in
determining the amount and sufficiency of capital possessed by a defendant
corporation,10 2 this evidence seemed to command judicial attention.10 3 In
particular, courts focused on the amount of initial capital supplied by an
incorporator, grounded in the fact that minimum statutory requirements had
replaced individual legislative scrutiny over when to grant a corporate
charter.10 4 But the gradual relaxation of these statutory requirements to a
nominal, if any, amount over the course of the twentieth century has eroded
the utility of initial capital for veil-piercing purposes. 0 5 As a result, the focus has expanded to include whether there was sufficient capital at the time
of the alleged misconduct or, alternatively, if assets had been siphoned for a

100. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1335 (acknowledging that veil-piercing may be
justified "if shareholders have deliberately ignored corporate formalities to mislead creditors into
believing they were dealing with the shareholders directly rather than with agents of a
corporation").
101. See, e.g., ELVIN R. LATTY, SUBSIDIARIES AND AFFILIATED CORPORATIONS

§ 36,

at 128

(1936) ("[I]n the case of the inadequately financed corporation ... the creditor [can] be said to rely
on the capital or financial resources reasonably to be expected of an owner .... The law cannot
compel business success; it can compel fair dealing."); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., The Theory ofEnterprise
Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 343, 349 n.15 (1947) ("In all cases insufficient capitalization is
persuasive evidence that the enterprise was not separate."). But see Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Dupuy &
Dupuy Developers, Inc., 227 So. 2d 265, 269 (La. Ct. App. 1969) ("Inadequate capitalization is not
of itself a badge of fraud.").
102. See, e.g., Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 309-10 (8th Cir. 1992)
(interpreting "properly capitalized" as including "financial responsibility" on the way to assessing
the sufficiency of a defendant's liability insurance); James R. Gillespie, The Thin CorporateLine:
Loss of Limited Liability Protection, 45 N.D. L. REV. 363, 386-87 (1969) ("Courts are ... hard

pressed to indicate what they actually mean by inadequate capitalization in the absence of
predetermined statutory or legal standards and perhaps the paucity of economic evidence and
evaluation in the individual cases.").
103. See, e.g., Douglas & Shanks, supra note 29, at 214 ("[A]n analysis of the cases seems to
indicate that the courts are more impressed by an obvious inadequacy of capital on the part of the
subsidiary than they are by the presence of any of the other indicia of identity between the
corporations . . . ."); Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 859 ("There is no question today but that
inadequate capital is considered by all courts to be one of the most important factors in cases
imposing liability on shareholders for corporate obligations.").
104. See, e.g., Hackney & Benson, supra note 28, at 851-52 (describing how state legislatures
shifted from granting corporate charters by scrutinizing individual operational plans to "adopt[ing]
general conditions to be met by all who sought to incorporate, including minimum capitalization
requirements").
105. See, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1337 ("[Tlaken by itself initial capitalization should be
of limited relevance to the question of shareholder liability for corporate obligations. Corporation
statutes no longer include requirements for minimal initial capitalization or ongoing levels of
capital.").
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shareholder's own use. 106 Whatever the relevant time, the sufficiency of
capital would seem to bear more directly on the moral-hazard problem and
thus have more relevance in Tort.o0
Thompson's study seems to suggest otherwise. Undercapitalization
appears in only a small fraction of veil-piercing cases in Tort (as well as
Contract), and its mention is correlated with a modest overall veil-piercing
According to Thompson, these findings paint
rate of 53.22%.108
undercapitalization's role in Tort as "an issue that appeals to commentators
for reasons other than its predictive significance."l 09 Merely examining the
frequency of a rationale's mention in cases, however, tells only part of the
story. Undercapitalization may not appear often with Tort, but it may nevertheless play a disproportionately more instrumental role in an ultimate
decision to pierce there than with Contract. Without such data, the predictive
value of this or any other rationale seems unclear, at best.
B. A New MethodologicalLeaf
This study examines veil-piercing cases in Westlaw from 1658 up to
and including 2006.110 Combinations of two search phrases, "pierc! /s veil"
and "disregard! /s (entity entities)," were run in two comprehensive Westlaw
databases whose coverages both begin in 1658.111 The same searches also

106. See, e.g., Pierson v. Jones, 625 P.2d 1085, 1089 n.1 (Idaho 1981) (Bistline, J., dissenting)
("As to the issue of undercapitalization, the issue is not whether the corporation was initially
undercapitalized, but whether [the defendant] drained the corporate assets for his own use."). But
see, e.g., Secon Serv. Sys., Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank & Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 416 (7th Cir. 1988)
("A requirement to provide continuing capitalization, as [plaintiffj urges, probably would injure
noncontrolling creditors, rather than helping them, by precipitating unnecessary forced sales.");
Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1165,

1174 ("[G]enerally one must look to the capitalization of the corporation when it is formed-not
during subsequent periods of operation.").
107. See, e.g., Robert E. Dye, Note, Inadequate Capitalization as a Basis for Shareholder
Liability: The CaliforniaApproach and a Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 823, 836 (1972)

("The case for inadequate capitalization as a basis for shareholder liability is perhaps strongest
where the corporate creditor is a [T]ort victim with an unpaid judgment."). But see Hackney &
Benson, supra note 28, at 869 ("It should, however, be noted that in almost every [T]ort
case ... where undercapitalization was stressed in the denial of limited liability, the court has found
additional factors constituting misuse of the corporate form .... ).
108. But see Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1066 n.149 (reporting

undercapitalization present in 12 Torts cases with a 75.00% veil-piercing rate versus 87 Contracts
cases with a 70.11% veil-piercing rate); id. at 1063 tbl. 11 (reporting a total of 120 cases with a
73.33% veil-piercing rate).
109. Id. at 1067.
110. Cf Brian N. Lizotte, Publish or Perish: The Electronic Availability of Summary

Judgments by Eight District Courts, 2007 WIS. L. REv. 107, 134 (examining summary judgment
cases and finding that "Lexis and Westlaw were highly consistent in the cases they reported" and
"[t]he agreement between the services was statistically strong").
111. Scope of ALLCASES, WESTLAw. http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?dbALLCASES&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLWI0.08&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&
MST=; Scope of ALLCASES-OLD,

WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=
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were performed in specialized Westlaw databases and then cross-checked to
ensure the dataset's completeness.1 12 The dataset terminates at 2006 to
determine whether veil-piercing rates vary in "published" versus
"unpublished" dispositions, a distinction within federal courts that was implemented around 1973 and effectively terminated as of January 1, 2007."
The searches yielded an initial dataset of 15,188 cases.114 I discarded
cases without any relevant or meaningful reference to veil-piercing and then
coded the remaining dataset of 11,546 cases. I collected data for a decision's
year, publication status, and precedential value; the court's jurisdiction and
type; the source of the law applied; the type of defendant and shareholder; all
of the substantive claims connected to veil-piercing; and all of the rationales
that appeared instrumental to the court's decision whether to pierce.
Five groups of cases then were set aside. The first group comprises
cases against only an unincorporated business entity, such as an LLC or
LLP." 5 The second group comprises direct liability," 6 director or officer

ALLCASES-OLD&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW1O.08&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=-top&
MT=208&MST=.
112. The specialized databases are ALLFEDS, SCT, CTA, DCT, DCT-OLD, ALLSTATES,
and ALLSTATES-OLD.
113. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (permitting citations of all decisions "designated as
unpublished,' 'not for publication,' 'non-precedential,' 'not precedent,' or the like"); David R.
Cleveland, Overturning the Last Stone: The Final Step in Returning PrecedentialStatus to All

Opinions, 10 J.APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 61, 85, 94 (2009) (discussing the history of the precedential
value of unpublished decisions). Numerous states, however, continue to permit unpublished or
nonprecedential decisions. See Shenoa L. Payne, The Ethical Conundrums of Unpublished
Opinions, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 723, 754 (2008) ("[S]tate courts are still free to promulgate

their own rules of court regarding unpublished state court decisions.").
114. The broader search terms yield almost twice as many cases as Thompson would have
collected over his initial time frame. By comparison, Thompson's search terms would have yielded
7,148 cases over the same time frame. Thompson also used four unidentified Westlaw Key
Numbers, Thompson, Empirical Piercing,supra note 20, at 1036 n.1, but searches using the four
most likely candidates (101kl.4!, 101kl.5!, lOlkl.6!, lOlkl.7!) yield only an additional 1,379
cases, for a total just over half the amount obtained here.
115. E.g., Faulkner v. Kornman (In re The Heritage Org.), 413 B.R. 438, 514 n.64 (Bankr. N.D.
Tex. 2009) ("It is unclear if the alter ego theory applies to limited partnerships in Delaware.");
Pinebrook Props., Ltd. v. Brookhaven Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, 77 S.W.3d 487, 499 (Tex. App.Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) ("The theory of alter ego, or piercing the corporate veil, is
inapplicable to partnerships."). Courts in most jurisdictions, in agreement with most commentators,
permit veil-piercing of LLCs. See, e.g., Ditty v. CheckRite, Ltd., 973 F. Supp. 1320, 1335 (D. Utah
1997) ("While there is little case law discussing veil piercing theories outside the corporate context,
most commentators assume that the doctrine applies to limited liability companies."). But a number
of relevant substantive differences between LLCs and corporations militate against unified analysis.
See, e.g., Hollowell v. Orleans Reg'1 Hosp., No. Civ.A. 95-4029, 1998 WL 283298, at *9 (E.D. La.
May 29, 1998). In Hollowell, the court noted,
Professor Kalinka cautions that the analyses between corporate veil piercing and
limited liability company veil piercing may not completely overlap, noting that
"[b]ecause the Louisiana LLC law requires fewer formalities such as annual elections
of directors, keeping minutes, or holding meetings, failure to follow these formalities
should not serve as grounds for piercing the veil of an LLC."
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 9 SUSAN KALINKA, LOUISIANA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
AND PARTNERSHIPS § 1.32, at 64 (1997)); see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Abolishing LLC Veil
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participation," or successor liability cases," all of which are often conflated with veil-piercing.119 The third group comprises cases involving
reverse-piercing or triangular-piercing, both of which are substantively distinct from orthodox veil-piercing. 120 The fourth group comprises cases that
were decided subsequently by a higher court, those remanded or vacated
without instructions, and those not decided by trial, such as motions to
dismiss, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or for summary
judgment. 121 And the final group comprises so-called attribution cases122 in
which a shareholder's action or status is imputed to the defendant corporation
for the purposes of, inter alia, agriculture,1 23 arbitration,12 4 bankruptcy,125

Piercing,2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 77, 77 ("This extension of a seriously flawed doctrine into a new
arena is not required by statute and is insupportable as a matter of policy.").
116. E.g., Wicks v. Milzoco Builders, Inc., 470 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa. 1983) ("There is a distinction
between liability for individual participation in a wrongful act and an individual's responsibility for
any liability-creating act performed behind the veil of a sham corporation.").
117. E.g., Advanced Constr. Corp. v. Pilecki, 901 A.2d 189, 195 (Me. 2006) ("Corporate
officers who participate in wrongful acts can be held liable for their individual acts, and such
liability is distinct from piercing the corporate veil.").
118. E.g., Explosives Corp. of Am. v. Garlam Enters. Corp., 615 F. Supp. 364, 368 (D.P.R.
1985) ("[T]he doctrine of disregarding the corporate entity is distinct from the question of a
successor's liability .... ).
119. See, e.g., Wicks, 470 A.2d at 88-90 (discussing the Superior Court's erroneous conflation
of direct liability with veil-piercing).
120. See, e.g., Nursing Home Consultants, Inc. v. Quantum Health Servs., Inc., 926 F. Supp.
835, 840 n.12 (E.D. Ark. 1996). In Nursing Home Consultants, the court described triangularpiercing and reverse-piercing as follows:
Conceptually, a triangular pierce results from a sequential application of the traditional
piercing doctrine and the 'reverse piercing' doctrine[,] which is itself controversial in
that it allows corporations to be held liable for the acts of their
shareholders, . . . permits two related, though independent, corporate entities ... ,
corporations which hold no ownership interest in each other, to be held liable for the
malfeasance of the other.
Id.

121. See, e.g., Carte Blanche (Sing.) PTE., Ltd. v. Diners Club Int'l, Inc., 758 F. Supp. 908, 914
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) ("The Second Circuit has noted that the question of piercing the corporate veil is a
fact-intensive issue that generally must be submitted to the jury." (citing Am. Protein Corp. v. AB
Volvo, 844 F.2d 56 (2d Cir. 1988))). Segregating summary judgment cases is also justified because
of the asymmetrical standard and the different meanings to be ascribed to an outcome based on
overwhelming evidence versus a genuine issue of material fact. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil et al., A
Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six FederalDistrict Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL

LEGAL STUD. 861, 886-89 (2007) (finding that 72% of motions in 2000 were filed by defendants
(with a 49% success rate) versus 28% by plaintiffs (with a 36% success rate)); Kevin M. Clermont,
Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919, 1941 (2009) ("[I]t is easier to obtain

summary judgment against the party who will bear at least the burden of production at trial . . . .").
122. See, e.g., Sternberg v. O'Neil, 550 A.2d 1105, 1126 n.45 (Del. 1988) ("Under the
attribution theory, only the precise conduct shown to be instigated by the parent is attributed to the
parent; the rest of the subsidiary's actions still pertain only to the subsidiary. The two corporations
remain distinct entities." (citation omitted)).
123. See, e.g., Morris Okun, Inc. v. Harry Zimmerman, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 346, 348 (S.D.N.Y.
1993) ("PACA [The Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act] establishes a statutory trust for the
benefit of sellers and suppliers. . . . This legal framework is to be distinguished from the piercing
the veil doctrine .... ).
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discrimination,12 6 environmental,127 ERISA/Social Security, 128 jurisdiction, 129
labor," tax,13 ' and workers' compensation claims. 13 2

124. See, e.g., Laborers' Int'l Union v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 868 F.2d 573, 576 (3d Cir. 1989)
("The requirement for a judicial determination of the [contractual] obligation to arbitrate may not be
circumvented in this case by relying on the parent-subsidiary relationship .... ).
125. See, e.g., Zubik v. Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Cases in bankruptcy ... call
for an entirely different evaluation of 'fraud' or 'injustice' than cases of controlled corporate
subsidiaries, or as in this instance, a case of corporate tort." (citations omitted)).
126. See, e.g., Dearth v. Collins, 441 F.3d 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2006) ("[T]here is nothing in
Title VII that supports [the] claim that individual capacity liability can be imposed on the basis of
the alter ego doctrine, and the only circuit that we found to have addressed the issue rejected the
argument."); Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 262 (7th Cir. 2001) ("Our rejection of the 'alter ego'
theory is further supported by Congress' aversion to individual liability under Title VII."). But see
Papa v. Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-41 (7th Cir. 1999) (abrogating the "integrated
enterprise" test for corporate parents under the Americans with Disabilities Act, Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and Title VII in favor of certain possibly justified scenarios). In Papa, Judge
Posner reasoned,
If because of neglect of corporate formalities, or a holding out of the parent as the real
party . . . a parent (or other affiliate) would be liable for the torts or breaches of
contract of its subsidiary, it ought equally to be liable for the statutory torts created by
federal antidiscrimination law....
... [W]e cannot think of a good reason why the legal principles governing affiliate
liability should vary from statute to statute, unless the statute, or the particular policy
that animates the statute, ordains a particular test.
Id. at 941. But "[t]he primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title VII in particular is
remedial.... To effectuate its purpose of eradicating the evils of employment discrimination,
Title VII should be given a liberal construction." Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th
Cir. 1983), abrogated on other grounds, Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). This
conflicts with the common law presumption against corporate disregard, which also involves an
inquiry into control or domination that is substantively distinct from whether a parent constitutes an
"employer" under the various statutes. See, e.g., Worth, 276 F.3d at 259-61 (analyzing separately a
defendant's qualification as an employer under Title VII and its status as an alter ego of another
corporation).
127. See, e.g., Comm'r v. RLG, Inc., 755 N.E.2d 556, 563 (Ind. 2001) ("The responsible
corporate officer doctrine is distinct from piercing the corporate veil, and explicitly expands liability
beyond veil piercing.").
128. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 461 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he
corporate veil may be pierced more easily in ERISA cases than in pure [C]ontract cases in order to
promote the federal policies underlying the statute . . . .").
129. See, e.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899, 903 (2d Cir. 1981) ("In deciding
whether the corporation is a real or a shell entity, the appropriate standard should not be the very
stringent test, normally applied in other contexts, for piercing the corporate veil.... The fiduciary
shield doctrine ... is not concerned with liability. It is concerned with jurisdiction. . . .").
130. See, e.g., UA Local 343 of the United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48
F.3d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) ("The alter ego doctrine as developed in labor law is analytically
different from the traditional veil-piercing doctrine as developed in corporate law.").
131. See, e.g., Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1979)
("[T]here are two separate and independent doctrines which act as a basis for the disregard of the
corporate fiction. The one is the equitable alter ego doctrine; the other involves disregarding the
corporate fiction whenever it serves the purposes of the tax statute.").
132. See, e.g., Crissman v. Healthco Int'l, Inc., No. 89 C 8298, 1992 WL 223820, at *7 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 2, 1992) ("The traditional definition of a corporation's alter ego ... springs from an
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These exclusions resulted in a final dataset of 2,908 cases. Whenever a
court applied separate veil-piercing analyses to different codefendant
shareholders, the decision was split into separate entries.13 3 There are thus a
total of 2,929 observations in the final dataset. And whenever multiple
claims, shareholders, or rationales appeared in a case, all of them were coded
on a nonexclusive basis, and thus the totals for those observations exceed the
total number of cases.
To obtain a more fine-grained portrait, I collected data on specific
subclaims. Fraud claims were classified as Common Law Deceit or Fraud,
Innocent
Transfer,
Fraudulent
Misrepresentation,
Fraudulent
Misrepresentation, or Negligent Misrepresentation.1 34 Using Meir DanCohen's scheme for measuring bargaining power, Contract claims were classified as bargains between individual(s) and organization(s), or between
organization(s) and organization(s).135 And using Prosser and Keeton's
architecture, Tort claims were classified as Intentional Tort Against a Person,
Intentional Tort Against Property, Negligence, Strict Liability, or Tortious
Interference with Contract.' 3 6
I also collected data on the rationales that seem instrumental to a court's
ultimate decision whether to pierce. Fifteen categories were used: agency,
alter ego, assumption of risk, commingling, control or domination, fraud or
misrepresentation, informalities, injustice or unfairness, instrumentality,
procedure, sham or shell, siphoning of funds, statutory policy,
undercapitalization, and other.' 3 1 Subcategories also were used for certain
rationales. Commingling was divided into whether it involved advertising,
accounts or assets, contracts, directors, employees, officers, records, retirement plans, stationery, or taxes. Fraud or misrepresentation was divided into
entirely different context having little bearing upon the concerns underlying the Workers'
Compensation Act.").
133. This virtually tracks the distinction between corporate and individual shareholders.
134. Also included within the Common Law Deceit or Fraud group were cases with an
ambiguous reference to some kind of fraud claim.
135. See MEIR DAN-COHEN,

RIGHTS, PERSONS,

AND ORGANIZATIONS 83 (1986)

("If

organizations are to be acknowledged as distinctive legal actors, ... the law has to deal with
interactions among organizations (0-0 relations), and with 'mixed' interactions, in which
individuals interact with organizations (0-1 relations)."). Dan-Cohen's scheme actually comprises
three types of relations, id., but bargains as between individual(s) and individual(s) are not
applicable here as one of the parties in a veil-piercing situation must be a corporation.
136. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS

§ 7,

at 31-

32 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that "[tihere are many possible approaches to the law of [T]orts,
and ... [b]y some odd coincidence, the classifications usually have gone by threes, and nearly
everyone has found some 'tripartite division,"' and proceeding to divide the area into three parts,
based on the Restatement of Torts: intent, negligence, and strict liability). But their treatise actually
is organized around the five classic types of torts that are used here. Id at xv.
137. But cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing,supra note 20, at 1044 (using a universe of eighty-

five possible rationales organized into "several major categories"). Thompson, however, presented
select results for only twelve different rationales. See id. at 1063 tbl. 11, 1064-65 n.141. Many of
these rationales were used here to facilitate comparison, along with a few others based upon a
survey of the cases.
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whether it concerned a defendant corporation's assets, ultimate shareholder's
identity, or some ambiguous reference. Informalities was divided into a
failure to conduct meetings, failure to maintain records, or some other
irregularity. Procedure was divided into whether it involved a failure to raise
And
veil-piercing, inadequate pleading, or a jurisdictional defect.138
undercapitalization was divided into whether there was inadequate capital at
incorporation or some later time.
The instrumental rationale data are the product of a subjective process.
Thompson's study collected data on whether a rationale simply was mentioned in connection with the decision whether to pierce. 139 In contrast the
present study's data on instrumental rationales merely may indicate what
courts choose to cite in support of their ultimate decision. 14 0 To an extent
this functionalist concern is constrained by the evidence available to a court
as well as the court's integrity in articulating a justification.141 More
importantly, extracting a case's ratio decidendi is fundamental to our
precedent-based system, and publicly available cases are the only insight into
42
judicial reasoning accessible to entrepreneurs, litigants, and other courts.1
Accordingly, the present data most directly reflect what actually informs
these parties' deliberations.
Thompson's and this study's results are subject to selection bias. Both
studies ran particular search phrases within Westlaw's electronic database of
cases over a certain time frame.14 3 Although Westlaw does feature
138. The procedure rationale concerns the nature of the reason cited by a court in disposing of a
case and not the issue in which veil-piercing was couched. Thompson does not include procedure
as a rationale for which data were collected, but he does devote a separate subsection to cases
involving procedural questions, such as the fiduciary shield doctrine, that were included in his
dataset. See id. at 1059-60.
139. See id. at 1044 ("[T]he reasons courts gave to explain their decision to either pierce or not
pierce the corporate veil were collected. These were less objective than the inquiries made above
and reflected a judgment by the court to cite the presence or absence of certain factors.").
140. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 104 n.* (1930) ("'I saw where

justice lay, and the moral sense decided the court half the time; I then sat down to search the
authorities . . . but I almost always found principles suited to my view of the case. . . .' (emphasis
removed) (quoting a personal letter from "a great American judge," Chancellor Kent)).
141. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-40 (1986) (articulating his theory of

adjudication, "Law as [I]ntegrity").
142. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know
How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1195 (1991) ("Published opinions are all
most of us ever work from."); Alan L. Tyree, Fact Content Analysis of Case Law: Methods and
Limitations, 22 JURIMETRICS 3. 1, 2 (1981) ("[U]sing the reported facts of the judgment ... is

precisely what every lawyer does when reading a case for the purpose of applying it to, or
distinguishing it from, the case which is currently being argued."). But cf, Mark A. Hall &
Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 97

(2008) ("As the quip goes in the world of computers: garbage in, garbage out.").
143. Thompson deserves considerable credit for his use of Westlaw, which had been introduced
only about fifteen years prior to the completion of his study. See, e.g., William G. Harrington, A
Brief History of Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 77 LAW LIBR. J. 543, 543 (1985) (stating, in

1985, that twenty years ago "[1]egal research by computer was unknown"). Some, including this
author, may recall the excruciating experience of working with user-unfriendly Westlaw-only
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"unpublished" and "nonprecedential" dispositions, even these represent only
a fraction of matters involving veil-piercing.144 Some matters arise and are
resolved before even reaching a court. 14 5 Further, after a complaint has been
filed, some matters are arbitrated, mediated, settled, dismissed, or summarily
adjudged prior to a trial,14 6 and there is evidence suggesting that settlement
rates may vary based on the type of claim.14 7 Litigants' attorney-fee
arrangements, estimated probabilities of success, perceived significance of
the dispute, and resources all also can affect a matter's outcome.148
Moreover, the decision to make a case available to Westlaw can be the
product of selective discretion.14 9 Accordingly, publicly available decisions
may reflect a myriad of dynamics independent of a matter's merits. Indeed,
Thompson has speculated that some of these selection effects may explain
the asymmetry of veil-piercing in Contract versus Tort:
There may be some selection bias in this area or the parties may have
different stakes in the outcome. The change in [P]roduct-[L]iability
computer terminals and waiting for tortoise-paced printouts. More relevantly, ever since its debut,
Westlaw has been expanding its databases' coverage. See, e.g., Peter W. Martin, Reconfiguring
Law Reports and the Concept ofPrecedentfor a DigitalAge, 53 VILL. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) ("It was

not until the mid- to late 1990s that [Lexis and Westlaw] attained sufficient scope and functionality
to become comprehensive research environments-virtual libraries-rather than simply places to
begin case research."). The databases at Thompson's disposal thus may have featured much
narrower coverage than what was available for this study.
144. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Realities, 88 CORNELL L.
REV. 119, 125-26 (2002) ("On the one hand, judicial decisions represent only the very tip of the
mass of grievances... . On the other hand, published decisions are a skewed sample of that tip of
judicial decisions."); David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 710 (2007) (examining dockets from four federal district courts and finding
only 3.10% ofjudicial actions that resulted in an opinion).
145. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,

85-87 & fig.2 (1983) (conducting a survey of 5,000 households and finding that only about 5% of
grievances, albeit only in excess of$1,000, result in a court filing).
146. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, A World Without Trials?, 2006 J. DiSP. RESOL. 7, 8 (reporting

that, from 1962 to 2004, the number of terminated civil cases increased 400% while trials fell 32%).
147. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 133 (2009) (examining two federal district

court jurisdictions and finding that Tort cases settle at a higher rate than Contract cases).
148. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical
Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1990); Herbert M. Kritzer, Lawyer Fees
and Lawyer Behavior in Litigation: What Does the EmpiricalLiterature Really Say?, 80 TEXAS L.
REV. 1943 (2002); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection ofDisputesfor Litigation, 13

J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (all discussing how various factors impact what disputes are litigated).
149. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 107

(2002) ("While this [selection] rule commands that judges publish only those opinions that are 'of
general precedential value,' a rather large body of literature suggests that the rule is sufficiently
vague to permit circuit court judges to publish or not as they see fit." (citations omitted));
Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties and the Sin of Omission:

Testing the Meta-theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795 app. A at 1883-87 (2005) (detailing limitations of
Westlaw's databases and the possibility of systematic differences between federal and state court
decisions); Karen Swenson, Federal District Court Judges and the Decision to Publish, 25 JUST.

SYS. J. 121, 136 (2004) (finding that federal judges tend to publish opinions in which large
corporations and other members of the "economic upper class" are parties).
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law and [T]ort law generally in recent decades may have led plaintiffs
to bring suits that go beyond prior law. Additionally, the large
number of corporate defendants may mean that they have more to lose
than plaintiffs have to gain, pushing the results in the direction of less
piercing.o5 0
As a result, the findings in both studies may present a rather skewed portrait
of veil-piercing claims.' 5'
But this does not undermine the validity or utility of either study. As a
preliminary matter, veil-piercing is a remedial instrument for satisfying a
judgment that stands apart from a matter's substantive cause(s) of action; 152a
veil-piercing request is thus among the last things courts tend to hear within a
dispute. This delayed ripeness would seem to mute selection effects
somewhat, as the bulk of matters disposed by dismissal, summary judgment,
or settlement will concern the substantive claim, and not veil-piercing;
accordingly, the population of cases may be more representative here than
for ordinary causes of action. Further, the undeniable impact that publicly
available cases have on the behavior of courts, firms, and litigants would
seem to be quite stable, as the overall pattern of veil-piercing cases in the
present study has remained relatively constant over time. 153 Certainly, this
study's results should be understood as limited in scope and treated with appropriate care. But the continuing importance of Thompson's study and its
puzzling results within any discussion of veil-piercing provide sound reasons
for conducting a new study with a comparable yet refined methodology.
II.

Findings

Apparently the "mists of metaphor" envelop an empirical puzzle about
veil-piercing.154 Thompson's study suggests that veil-piercing claims are
being adjudicated in unpredicted and inexplicable ways. 5 5 We thus are presented with a puzzle involving commentators, courts, and the empirical

150. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1069-70.

151. This is the premise of Christina L. Boyd and David Hoffman's project, Disputing Limited
Liability, 104 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1483278,
which uses dockets to follow a sample of veil-piercing claims as they move through federal district
courts over a five-year period; notably, they find that 66% of cases containing a veil-piercing claim
ultimately settle and obtain results largely consistent with Thompson's study. Id.
152. See, e.g., Kern v. Gleason, 840 S.W.2d 730, 736 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, no writ)
("The piercing of the corporate veil is not a separate cause of action .... The various doctrines for
disregarding the corporate entity are only remedial, for they only expand the potential sources of
recovery.").
153. See infra Table 2.

154. See Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) ("The whole problem of
the relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of
metaphor.").
155. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1038 ("The results [of this study]
suggest that the factors affecting the judicial outcome are not necessarily as suggested by previous
commentary.").
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evidence. Determining which of these key pieces are amiss may suggest how
to diagnose the problems that plague veil-piercing. And until this positive
account of veil-piercing is resolved, engaging the normative question of what
to do with the doctrine seems aimless.
This study reexamines the empirical piece of veil-piercing. Although
basic statistics can reveal only so much, the doctrine's complex nature necessitates categorical reduction. This Part sifts through all the data and analyzes
the most notable results as they pertain to a court's jurisdiction, the law
applied, the supporting substantive claims, and the cited instrumental
rationales; when valuable, results for combinations of these categories also
are presented.156 This Part concludes with the results of recasting all of the
data in terms of voluntary and involuntary creditors.
A. Navigating the JurisdictionalWaters
The present study finds an overall veil-piercing rate of 48.51%. This is
substantially higher than the 40.18% rate found by Thompson's studyl 57 and
comports with George Priest and Benjamin Klein's hypothesis that plaintiffs
and defendants will prevail with equal frequency in tried cases. 5 8 The overall rate vacillated until the 1960s, an amount of volatility that is not
surprising given the relative paucity of cases up to that point.
Since the 1970s, the number of veil-piercing cases has increased
markedly, and the rate has stabilized. The increase roughly coincides with
the advent of unpublished and nonprecedential opinions, which comprise
20.70% of the final dataset but whose veil-piercing rates do not deviate considerably from the overall dataset.159

156. In the interest of economy, the discussion and tables do not present all the results for the
numerous possible combinations of data.
157. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1048 tbl. 1.
158. See Priest & Klein, supra note 148, at 20 (noting that "the model has demonstrated a
tendency toward 50 percent plaintiff victories in litigation"). But see Clermont & Eisenberg, supra
note 144, at 140 ("[O]ur work has shown that one should not expect 50% win rates.").
159. See infra Tables IA-B.
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Table lA. Veil-Piercing by Publication Status and Jurisdiction160
n
V-P Rate (%)
Status

605

Unpublished
Federal
State
Partially Published
Federal
State

Published
Federal
State

194
411

48.60
53.09
46.67

12

8.33

12

8.33

0

--

48.70

2312
647
1665

46.68
49.49

Table lB. Veil-Piercing by Precedential Status and Jurisdiction
Status
n
V-P Rate (%)
Precedential
2323
48.64
46.68
Federal
647
49.50
1676
State
48.02
Non-Precedential
6061
206
50.49
Federal
46.75
400
State
Veil-piercing cases then exploded during the 1980s at a rate lower than the
nationwide trend for all filings.' 6 ' All of these trends in the initial dataset are
reflected in the number of final observations per year:

160. Veil-piercing rates in bold exceed the overall rate of 48.51%.
161. Prior to 1980 there was an average of 9.29 veil-piercing cases per year, which increased to
63.4 cases per year from 1980 to 1989. The highest number of veil-piercing cases for that entire
decade came in 1989 and represents a 2.52% increase over the mean; 1989 also saw the highest
number of federal and state filings for that entire decade and represents a 28.29% increase over the
mean. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS (1980-

1993) ("United States District Courts-National Judicial Caseload Profile"); ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (1994-2006) ("Table C-2,

U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Commenced, by Basis of Jurisdiction and Nature of Suit During
the Twelve Month Period Ended March 31"); COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS (1981-1982, 1985-2007) (no data were collected
for 1983 and 1984).
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Figure 1. Observations over Time, 1866-2006162
100
9080 70
60
50
4030
20
10

-

0
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
1 Federal

0 State

The line marks 1986, the end point of Thompson's original study.163 Over
the same time frame, there are 1,415 observations in this study;164 from 1986
up to and including 2006, there are 1,514 observations.165
Table 2. Veil-Piercing by Decade
% of Total
n
Decade

V-P Rate (%)

1860-1869

1

0.03

0.00

1870-1879
1880-1889
1890-1899

1
1
6

0.03
0.03
0.20

100.00
0.00
66.67

1900-1909

4

0.14

75.00

1910-1919

23

0.79

60.87

1920-1929

55

1.88

47.27

1930-1939
1940-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
2000-2006

173
136
145
199
319
646
718
502

5.91
4.64
4.95
6.79
10.89
22.06
24.51
17.14

52.02
42.65
57.93
50.25
49.53
46.75
46.38
49.40

162. See infra Table 2.

163.
Westlaw
164.
165.

See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044 ("This project includes all
cases through 1985 concerning the issue of piercing the corporate veil.").
Cf id. at 1049 tbl.2 (reporting 1,585 cases up to and including 1985).
But see supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Veil-piercing claims prevail exclusively against close corporations.
Table 3. Veil-Piercing by Corporation Type
n
Corporation
2925
Close
4
Public

V-P Rate (%)
48.58
0.00

This is easily explained by the tendency of public corporations to feature
disperse shareholding that in turn precludes a sufficient level of control or
domination to justify veil-piercing.1 66 There are some successful piercing
claims against close corporations held by a public corporate affiliate or
parent, but the total data are incomplete given the failure of some decisions
to specify the shareholder's status.
More difficult to explain is that veil-piercing clearly presents a greater
risk to individual shareholders than corporate parents.
Table 4. Veil-Piercing by Shareholder Type and Jurisdiction
V-P Rate (%)
n
Shareholder
41.17
889
Entity
37.14
377
Federal
44.14
512
State
Federal
State

51.69

2047

Person

482
1565

I

55.60
50.48

These results not only comport with Thompson's' 6 7 but hold across federal
and state courts, as well as for each and every type of substantive claim. 68

166. See, e.g., GEVURTZ, supra note 59, § 1.5.3, at 78-79 ("[R]equiring control screens out
piercing against the shareholders of a publicly traded corporation ... . This provides a doctrinal
underpinning to explain the fact that there never has been a case in which the court pierced to hold
shareholders in a public corporation liable for the company's debts.").
167. Cf Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1055 tbl.7 (reporting a 43.13% rate
for 339 individual-shareholder cases versus 37.21% for 237 corporate-parent cases); Thompson,
Group Piercing,supra note 20, at 386 tbl. I (reporting a 34.00% rate for 547 corporate-group cases
up to and including 1996). Matheson's study finds a 20.56% veil-piercing rate: "This difference is
substantial: substantive piercing in the parent-subsidiary context occurs approximately half as often
as piercing does generally, and more than one-third less often than the most comparable database
explored by other studies." Matheson, supra note 73, at 1114. Matheson's comparison with
Thompson's as well as Hodge and Sachs's studies, however, makes the surprisingly simple error of
mismatching time frames. Thompson's results concern all cases in his study up to and including
1996. Thompson, Group Piercing,supra note 20, at 385. Hodge and Sachs's sample consisted of
cases from 1986 up to and including 1995. Hodge & Sachs, supra note 73, at 347. Matheson's
study, in contrast, examines cases from January 1, 1990 up to March 1, 2008. Matheson, supra
note 73, at 1108 n.51. The problem is that the veil-piercing rate for corporate groups may have
declined over Matheson's time frame. And this is in fact the case. The present dataset finds a
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The data collectively rebut a broad conviction that veil-piercing is more
judicially compelling in the parent-subsidiary context. 16 9 This chasm may be
due to a multilevel misunderstanding. There is apparently a prevailing belief
and criticism that courts apply essentially the same test to corporate and individual shareholders.o7 0 While this was true at the turn of the twentieth
century, when states began to permit corporate groups,17 1 courts now seem to
have shifted their view:
An individual shareholder, by virtue of his ownership of shares, does
not own the corporation's assets and, as a result, does not own
subsidiary corporations in which the corporation holds an interest....
A corporate parent which owns the shares of a subsidiary does not, for
that reason alone, own or have legal title to the assets of the

42.63% rate for corporate-parent cases prior to 1990, versus a 38.96% rate for such cases from 1990
up to and including 2006. Cf McPherson & Raja, supra note 73, at 18 (reporting a 16.46% veilpiercing rate against corporate parents from a sample of cases from 1996 up to and including 2005).
The decline is not very steep and the rate is considerably higher than Matheson's, but this may be
attributed to some considerable differences in the construction of the respective studies' datasets.
Compare Matheson, supra note 73, at 1109-12 (detailing Matheson's methodology), with supra
subpart I(B). Far more important is that all of the empirical studies using nonsampled data find that
individual shareholders are much more vulnerable to veil-piercing than corporate parents.
168. See infra Figure 5; cf Matheson, supra note 73, at 1122 tbl.7 (reporting specific results for
claims against corporate groups).
169. See, e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT,
AND OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY

CORPORATIONS, at xl (1987) ("[M]ost of the presumed advantages of limited liability are simply
irrelevant where corporate groups are involved."); supra note 26 and accompanying text. Stephen
Presser presents an interesting argument that a commitment to democratic individualism may
explain the diverse coalition of scholars who are critical of extending broader limited liability
protection to corporate groups. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:11, at 1-67.
170. Kurt Strasser, for instance, has expressed this view succinctly:
While traditional corporate law has not articulated different rules for a parent
company in its role as a shareholder than for individual investor shareholders, parent
companies in fact present different policy issues and their limited liability should be
determined by a different analysis. The core idea is that a parent company as a
shareholder in its subsidiary companies is in quite a different economic role and
performs quite a different management function than individual investor
shareholders .... The parent is not an independent investor.
Kurt A. Strasser, Piercingthe Veil in CorporateGroups, 37 CONN. L. REV. 637, 638 (2005). There

is yet another level, of no consequence here, with regard to the use of agency principles:
It is useful to distinguish situations in which liability is imposed on a parent because of
the existence of the agency relation .. . from cases in which the corporate veil of the
subsidiary is pierced for other reasons of policy. Unfortunately, however, the courts
have not always observed the distinction between these two separate bases for parent's
liability.... The erroneous language, however, has not resulted in unjust decisions in
most cases.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14M reporter's note (1958). Interestingly, this language
did not survive revision. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 reporter's note (2006).
171. See, e.g., BLUMBERG, supra note 168, at xxxix-xI ("When ... corporate groups became

possible ... courts applied the same standard to a shareholder that was in fact a parent corporation
even though ultimate investors were not involved at all."); HENN, supra note 6, § 148, at 258
("Generally-speaking, the principles governing one-man, family, and other close corporations are
applicable to subsidiary and other affiliated corporations."). But see supranote 169.
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subsidiary; and, it follows with even greater force, the parent does not
own or have legal title to the subsidiaries of the subsidiary. 17 2
This sweeping generalization contrasts with the academic debate, which has
focused on the structure of economic incentives. Some regard corporate
shareholders as presenting a potentially greater moral-hazard problem,173
while others view veil-piercing as a potential threat to stimulating investment
in corporate parents.' 74 That courts reach into the assets of individual shareholders more frequently does not mean the commentary is incorrect, merely
that the antithetical positions seem to proceed from different premises.
Far more congruous are the federal and state veil-piercing rates. Federal
litigants enjoy considerably more success in district court than in the court of
appeals, 75 which suggests that trial defendants may have an added incentive
to seek reversal of an unfavorable decision. 76
Table 5. Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction and Court
V-P Rate (%)
n
Court
Federal
853
47.60
413
54.72
Trial
40.74
432
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme

State
Trial
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme

50.00

8

48.89

2076
192
1318
566

44.79
48.48
51.24

172. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 475 (2003) (citations omitted).
173. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 111 ("[T]he moral-hazard problem is
probably greater in parent-subsidiary situations because subsidiaries have less incentive to insure.").
174. See, e.g., PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:11, at 1-67 ("Presumably, those who profit by
reducing the risk to the parent are the parent's shareholders, and, presumably, the more we reduce
their risk and thereby raise the potential profit to them the more we will encourage their
investment.").
175. The high veil-piercing rate in Supreme Court cases should be discounted given their
miniscule number. Not easily dismissed, however, is that the veil-piercing rate in federal district
courts is higher than that in any other level of federal or state court. This raises a potential
representativeness concern with Boyd and Hoffman's exclusively federal sample. See Boyd &
Hoffman, supra note 151 (manuscript at 27).
176. But see, e.g., Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary
Insights into the "Affirmance Effect" on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.

REV. 357, 359-63, 360 figs.2 & 3 (2005) (reporting an increase in the affirmance rate of the courts
of appeals from 72% in 1945 to 91% in 2003, in contrast to a steady rate for the Supreme Court).
To be clear, this study does not establish whether there is a weaker "affirmance effect" for veilpiercing cases, as only the highest relevant decision from a case was coded and information on
affirmances or reversals was not collected. For instance, one possibility may be that losing
plaintiffs pursue futile appeals on a disproportionate basis.
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Although a federal common law does exist,177 veil-piercing is predominantly
a creature of state law. Consistent with the nature of corporation statutes as
well as the most common types of substantive claims, state courts produced
70.88% of the total observations. Surprisingly, unlike their federal peers,
state litigants appear to experience increasing veil-piercing success at successively higher levels of the judicial system.' 78 This, however, may reflect
wrinkles within the original database's scope, as Westlaw does not feature
comprehensive coverage of state trial and intermediate appellate court
decisions;17 9 the problem seems most pronounced at the trial court level,
which accounts for only 9.25% of the total state observations.180
Nevertheless, these results roughly comport with the rates for all other
federal and state court levels as well as the overall rate; accordingly, if the
state trial court results can be regarded as somewhat representative, then they
suggest that plaintiffs with stronger cases tend to pursue appeals.s18
B. Exploring the State of Veil-Piercing
Veil-piercing claims are susceptible to some forum shopping. Potential
defendants can exert some control by deciding where to incorporate and then
attempting to invoke the internal-affairs doctrine, which applies the law of
the state of incorporation to resolve certain choice-of-law disputes.182 Not all
jurisdictions, however, apply the doctrine to veil-piercing disputes, either
because a superior interest belongs to a nonincorporating state, or the traditional province of "internal affairs" concerns shareholder disputes with

177. See, e.g., Bergesen v. Lindholm, 760 F. Supp. 976, 986 (D. Conn. 1991) ("[This] court
applies federal common law, importing into its decision those principles of state law which it finds
both persuasive and appropriate to subsume.").
178. The standard of review for veil-piercing cases varies among federal circuits as well as
states. See, e.g., Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 148 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing
cases that variously apply either a "clearly erroneous" or a plenary/de novo standard of review to
veil-piercing decisions).
179. See, e.g., Morris L. Cohen, ResearchingLegal History in the DigitalAge, 99 LAW LIBR. J.

377, 386 (2007) ("Historical coverage of state court decisions in LexisNexis and Westlaw is still
limited. Both systems cover the highest court of most states back to their published beginnings, but
retrospective coverage of lower courts is much less extensive.").
180. Cf Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1050 tbl.4 (reporting only 401 trial
court versus 860 intermediate appellate court decisions).
181. But cf Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An
EmpiricalStudy of State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 138 (2009) (finding that

the reversal rates for state jury trials and appeals by defendants exceed those for plaintiffs).
182. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) ("No principle of
corporation law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority to regulate domestic
corporations . . . ."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 304 (1971)

("The local law

of the state of incorporation will be applied to determine the right of a shareholder to participate in
the administration of the affairs of the corporation ... except in the unusual case where . . . some

other state has a more significant relationship...."); id. §§ 145, 186-88 (indicating different
choice-of-law rules for Tort versus Contract claims).
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managers, not external creditors.183 Comparatively clearer is the choice afforded to prospective plaintiffs, whether voluntary or involuntary, 8 4 by the
opportunity to evaluate where to commence a suit. In this regard, one important consideration might be whether a jurisdiction exhibits a relatively lax
stance towards piercing.
Veil-piercing rates vary substantially based on which state's law is
applied.185 Litigants prevail at least 50.00% of the time under the law of
twenty-five different jurisdictions:
Figure 2. Overall v. State Law Veil-Piercing Rates186
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183. Compare Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32
J. CORP. L. 33, 94 n.311 (2006) ("Personal liability of officers, directors, and shareholders to the
corporation and its creditors falls squarely within the traditional understanding of internal affairs."),
with Jennifer J. Johnson, Risky Business: Choice-of-Law and the UnincorporatedEntity, 1 J. SMALL
& EMERGING Bus. L. 249, 272-73, 273 n.91 (1997) (observing that, while "[t]here is a general
consensus that the doctrine ... extends to the personal liability of shareholders for corporate debts,"
a few courts "have applied other conflicts theories to piercing issues").
184. But cf Hansmann & Kraakman, ProceduralFocus, supra note 91, at 450-51 (arguing for
application of the internal-affairs doctrine only to voluntary creditors, versus traditional conflicts
rules for involuntary creditors).
185. As with Thompson's study, the data here were not organized by jurisdiction as some cases
may apply foreign law, and the origin of the relevant test has a more direct bearing on the ultimate
decision to pierce. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1044 (stating that the
factual data presented include which jurisdiction's law was applied in the case, not the jurisdiction
in which the case was litigated).
186. See infra Table 6. Due to a lack of space, Table 6 omits data for cases applying the law of
foreign jurisdictions (0.00%, 1 case), Guam (100.00%, 3 cases), Northern Mariana Islands (50.00%,
2 cases), Puerto Rico (50.00%, 6 cases), and the Virgin Islands (0.00%, 1 case). Of these
jurisdictions Thompson reported data only from Puerto Rico. See Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,
supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6. For the curious, using the 2000 Presidential Electoral College results,
the veil-piercing rate was 49.75% in "Blue States" versus 4 5 .7 7 % in "Red States." See 2000
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote Table, FED. ELECTION COMM'N, http://www.fec.
gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm (displaying the 2000 electoral college results broken up by Red
States going to George Bush and Blue States going to Al Gore).
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All of the shaded states have a veil-piercing rate above the overall rate of
48.51%, with the five darkest states featuring a rate in excess of 66.66%.
The remaining states have a veil-piercing rate below the overall rate, with the
three dotted states-Maryland, New Hampshire, and Virginia-featuring a
rate less than 33.33%.
Table 6. Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction Law Applied
% of Total
n
State Law
1.37
40
Alabama
Alaska
14
0.48
1.02
30
Arizona
Arkansas
44
1.50
7.92
232
California
1.16
34
Colorado
2.53
74
Connecticut
Delaware
35
1.19
0.79
District of Columbia 23
Federal
111
3.79
3.58
105
Florida
2.94
86
Georgia
Hawaii

Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio

8

0.27

20

0.68

80
39
33
39
25
112
7
31
62
83
51
17
87
16
36
16
10
57
16
269
32
7
179

2.73
1.33
1.13
1.33
0.85
3.82
0.24
1.06
2.12
2.83
1.74
0.58
277
0.55
1.23
0.55
0.34
1.95
0.55
9.18
1.09
0.24
6.11

V-P Rate (%)
50.00
57.14
33.33
56.82
50.86
44.12
54.05
34.29
52.17

44.14
40.95
59.30
75.00 .

40.00
52.50
61.54
39.39
61.54
48.00
38.39
42.86
25.81
43.55
39.76
47.06
47.06
48.28
68.75
61.11
43.75
30.00
49.12
37.50
49.81
53.13
85.71
55.87
(continued)
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Table 6 (cont.). Veil-Piercing by Jurisdiction Law Applied
V-P Rate (%)
% of Total
n
State Law
51.85
0.92
27
Oklahoma
65.71
1.19
35
Oregon
44.44
5.53
162
Pennsylvania
15
0.51
53.33
Rhode Island
60.00
0.85
25
South Carolina
83.33
0.20
6
South Dakota
68.09
1.60
47
Tennessee
40.76
7.20
211
Texas
53.85
0.89
26
Utah
40.00
0.17
5
Vermont
29.09
1 88
55
Virginia
44.93
2.36
69
Washington
14
0.48
50.00
West Virginia
61.76
1.160
34
Wisconsin
61.90
0.72
21
Wyoming

I

One might expect a sizable number of cases to apply Delaware law, as
the jurisdiction is an epicenter of corporate law.187 But this is not the case,
perhaps because Delaware seems to be the preferred choice of relatively sophisticated incorporators that may have a keener awareness of the veilpiercing standard.'88 Despite the sea of ink spilled on the race for corporate
charters, there has been a curiously limited amount of focus on whether a
stiffer veil-piercing standard may enhance a jurisdiction's appeal to prospective incorporators.1 89 In this regard, Delaware law does not disappoint, with
a very low 34.29% veil-piercing rate and litigants prevailing a mere 21.43%
of the time against corporate parents, as compared to 40.91% against

187. See David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-Taking and
the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 239 (2009) (discussing factors that have

"made Delaware a center of American corporate law for generations").
188. See, e.g., Jens Dammann & Matthias Schuindeln, The Incorporation Choices of Privately

Held Corporations9 tbl.2 (The Univ. of Texas Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 119,
2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1049581 (finding that 53.10% of corporations that
incorporate outside of the state of their principal place of business choose Delaware).
189. While the Cary-Winter debate has raged for decades, see generally ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-31 (1993), veil-piercing has become involved

only recently. See, e.g., Dammann & Schiindeln, supra note 187, at 18 tbl.4 (finding the risk of
veil-piercing to be a statistically significant consideration in where to incorporate for corporations
with at least 1,000 employees); Douglas G. Smith, A Federalism-Based Rationale for Limited

Liability, 60 ALA. L. REV. 649, 669 (2009) ("To the extent limited liability is preserved, so is
shareholder wealth. Thus, all other things being equal, one would expect that shareholders and
corporate managers would be attracted to states with strong doctrines of limited liability."). But see,
e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What CorporateLaw Achievedfor Business Organizers
in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 437-41 (2003) (arguing from history that limited
liability may not have been a primary consideration for incorporators); Presser, supra note 59, at

159 ("[lit is the quality of the investment opportunity itself, and not the elimination of possible
personal liability, that leads an investor to commit his or her capital.").
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individuals. These results suggest that the state's purported reputation for
engaging in a "race to the bottom" remains intact.' 90 And that reputation has
roots within substantive law, as a long-standing strict requirement of "fraud
or something like it" coheres with the observation that piercing the veil under
Delaware law is "comparatively difficult."'91
The distinction of being the most difficult jurisdiction in which to pierce
belongs to Maryland. Veil-piercing claims prevailed a paltry 25.81% of the
time and never against a corporate parent.' 9 2 This appears to be the conscious product of Maryland's courts, which have described attempts to pierce
the veil under their state law as a "[H]erculean task." 9 3 Like Delaware, this
may be attributed to a "markedly restrictive approach" that requires proof of
actual common law fraud or evasion of a statute to justify veil-piercing.194

190. Guhan Subramanian, The DisappearingDelawareEffect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 56-57
(2004) (explaining that the promanagement trajectory of Delaware law is consistent with a "race to
the bottom"). But see, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279 (1985) (finding positive cumulative abnormal returns for

firms that reincorporate in Delaware, suggesting that the state is actually leading a race to the top).
By comparison, Thompson found absolutely no successful veil-piercing in eleven cases applying
Delaware law prior to 1986. See Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6.
Contra Equitable Trust Co. v. Gallagher, 99 A.2d 490, 493 (Del. 1953) ("But the corporate entity is
here of no importance. . . . We have here . . . the important facts that the defendant owned a clear

majority of the stock . .. and that he personally dominated the corporation in all its
operations .... ); Ford v. Harris Moving & Storage, Inc., C.A. No. 6359, 1981 WL 15151, at *1
(Del. Ch. June 16, 1981) ("Mr. Harris' manipulation of his corporation for his own benefit calls for
a disregard of the corporate entity, the piercing of the corporate veil and the imposition of personal
liability.. .. "); Ne. Loan v. Furniture Mart, C.A. No. 4901, 1977 WL 9536, at *6 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 21, 1977) (holding that the "corporate identity will be disregarded if its purpose is to shield
fraud, as I am satisfied was the case here"). Thompson also reported no successful veil-piercing in
three cases applying Puerto Rican law. See Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1051
tbl.6, 1053 n.91. ContraForastieri v. E. Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ. 79-2544(PG), 1983 WL 364564,
at *7 (D.P.R. July 5, 1983) ("[W]hen the result was to cause the corporation to default before the
principals of the corporation . .. it is fully justifiable for a court to pierce and disregard the
corporate veil and find plaintiffs to be one with the corporation .... .").
191. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:8, at 2-73; see also supra note 97 and accompanying text.
Recent decisions relaxing the "fraud or something like it" requirement, however, suggest to Presser
that "the days of Delaware as a state where it was exceptionally difficult to pierce the corporate veil
may be numbered." PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:8, at 2-88. From 1986 up to and including 2006,
38.46% of veil-piercing claims under Delaware law prevailed.
192. But see Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a

comparatively liberal 40.00% rate in 15 pre-1986 cases).
193. Dixon v. Process Corp., 382 A.2d 893, 895 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978) ("[W]oe unto the
creditor who seeks to rip away the corporate facade in order to recover from one sibling of the
corporate family what is due from another in the belief that the relationship is inseparable, if not
insufferable, for his is a [H]erculean task.").
194. Ice. Telecom, Ltd. v. Info. Sys. & Networks Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 585, 591 (D. Md.
2003); see also G. Michael Epperson & Joan M. Canny, The Capital Shareholder's Ultimate
Calamity: Pierced Corporate Veils and Shareholder Liability in the District of Columbia,

Maryland, and Virginia, 37 CATH. U. L. REv. 605, 637 (1988) (describing Maryland's approach as
a "bright-line test" that affords little judicial discretion).

118

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 89:81

Indeed, attempts to expand the standard to permit a mere showing of a need
"to enforce a paramount equity" apparently have failed.195
If Maryland resembles Hercules, then North and South Dakota are the
Scylla and Charybdis of veil-piercing.19 6 Although there is a miniscule number of cases in these jurisdictions, North Dakota's 85.71% and South
Dakota's 83.33% are two of the highest veil-piercing rates within the
dataset.19 7 And these states share more than just geographical proximity.
Neither jurisdiction requires a showing of actual fraud, instead permitting
proof of injustice or unfairness to suffice.198 Further, both states find evidence of inadequate capitalization to be important, if not compelling.' 99
Based on his comprehensive state-by-state review, Stephen Presser describes
North Dakota as producing "one of the purest undercapitalization cases ever
decided in the United States," that seems to "squarely fit within [Henry
Winthrop] Ballantine's ... theory that undercapitalization alone could support piercing the veil."200
Not surprisingly, California law is among the most frequently applied to
veil-piercing cases and features a 50.86% rate. 201' Ballantine's "optimistic

195. Residential Warranty Corp. v. Bancroft Homes Greenspring Valley, Inc., 728 A.2d 783,
789 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) ("Despite the proclamation that a court may pierce the corporate veil
to enforce a paramount equity, arguments that have urged a piercing of the veil 'for reasons other
than fraud' have failed in Maryland courts." (quoting Travel Comm., Inc. v. Pan Am. World
Airways, Inc., 603 A.2d 1301, 1317 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992))). Whether veil-piercing lies within
law or equity, though, is a matter of dispute among some courts. See, e.g., G-I Holdings, Inc. v.
Bennet (In re G-I Holdings, Inc.), 380 F. Supp. 2d 469, 476 (D.N.J. 2005) ("A circuit split exists as
to whether the nature of the relief in an action to pierce the corporate veil is legal or equitable.").
196. Cf HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 217 (Robert Fitzgerald trans., Vintage Classics 1990) ("And all

this time,/in travail, sobbing, gaining on the current,/we rowed into the strait-Skylla to port and on
our starboard beam Kharybdis, dire/gorge of the salt sea tide.").
197. Cf Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 75.00% rate for
4 North Dakota cases and a 62.50% for 8 South Dakota cases). Guam's 100.00% rate is the highest,
but the mere 3 cases in the dataset apply a test lifted from California law. See, e.g., Associated Ins.
Underwriters, Inc. v. Guam Int'l Insurers, Inc., Civ. No. 90-00059A, 1991 WL 336911, at *2 (D.
Guam June 18, 1991) (applying the Ninth Circuit's alter-ego test, which is derived from California
law).
198. See, e.g., Jablonsky v. Klemm, 377 N.W.2d 560, 563-64 (N.D. 1985) ("We ... follow the
generally accepted rule that proof of fraud is not a necessary prerequisite for disregarding the
corporate entity.... [T]here must exist an element of injustice or fundamental unfairness . . . .");
Mobridge Cmty. Indus., Inc. v. Toure, Ltd., 273 N.W.2d 128, 132 (S.D. 1978) (finding a sufficient
reason for veil-piercing to be "when retention of the corporate fiction would 'produce injustices and
inequitable consequences').
199. The Dakotas, however, appear to take different approaches to the Contract-Tort
distinction. Compare Jablonsky, 377 N.W.2d at 565 (embracing "the attitude toward judicial
piercing of the corporate veil [that] is more flexible in [T]ort, as opposed to ordinary [C]ontract
actions"), with Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian Sch., 438 N.W.2d 204, 209 (S.D. 1989) (suggesting
disagreement with the view that "some courts are more hesitant to pierce the corporate veil in
[C]ontract cases than [T]ort cases").
200. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:38, at 2-443; see also infra notes 201-03 and accompanying
text.
201. Cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing,supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 44.94% rate for
89 pre-1986 cases).
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reading of prior cases"202 about the sufficiency of undercapitalization arguably has contributed to California's reputation "as one of the jurisdictions
most likely to pierce the corporate veil." 20 3 Robert Clark, however, has
pointed out that undercapitalization alone is insufficient to justify veilpiercing in California. 2 04 Rather, the jurisdiction's relatively high veilpiercing rate may be attributable to an amorphous and liberal standard from
that supreme court of which Cardozo would be proud:
As the separate personality of the corporation is a statutory privilege,
it must be used for legitimate business purposes and must not be
perverted. When it is abused it will be disregarded and the
corporation looked at as a collection or association of individuals, so
that . .. the stockholders [will be] liable for acts done in the name of
the corporation.205
This standard might suggest that individual shareholders are more vulnerable
to veil-piercing than their corporate peers under California law,206 but the
results indicate that the distinction bears no difference. Courts reach into the
assets of an individual shareholder 50.28% of the time, as compared to
51.79% of the time for corporate parents, which is among the more notable
exceptions to the overall results in this regard.207
New York and Ohio law also rank among the most prominent producers
of veil-piercing cases with a rate exceeding the total dataset. 2 08 As a

202. Clark, supra note 85, at 547 n. 108 ("California courts have emphasized the importance of

inadequate capitalization.... These cases relied heavily on Ballantine's rather optimistic reading of
prior cases . . . .").
203. PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:5, at 2-31; see also id. § 1:9, at 1-51 to 1-52. But see
Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1052 (speculating that California's relatively
extended retention of a corporate statute providing for shareholder liability until 1931 "probably
contributed to a perception that public policy in California favored piercing the corporate veil").
204. See CLARK, supra note 15, at 81 n.10 ("[A]t least in recent years, inadequate capitalization
per se does not trigger veil piercing in California .... ).
205. Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 606 (Cal. 1985). In Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry.
Co., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y. 1926), Justice Cardozo proposed his own opaque alternative to the
metaphorical alter ego test:
The logical consistency of a juridicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times,
when ... essential to the end that some accepted public policy may be defended or
upheld .... At such times unity is ascribed to parts . . . for the reason that only thus can
we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form.
Id. at 61. In essence Cardozo's test relies on basic agency principles unless there is insufficient
evidence of control by a corporate parent; in that circumstance, a judicially identified public policy
(that arguably requires some kind of statutory source) may be used to thwart a perceived
"perversion" of concessionary privilege. Id. But see Michael, supra note 19, at 57 ("It makes no

logical sense to base veil-piercing in a theory of corporate privilege.").
206. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:5, at 2-46 (observing that California courts "seem to have
adopted a more conservative approach to piercing the veil in recent cases involving parentsubsidiary corporations, [but] they may occasionally pierce the veil with less hesitation in cases
involving individually-owned corporations").
207. See infra Table 4.

208. The top five producers of veil-piercing cases are, in order: New York, California, Texas,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania.

But see Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O'Hara, Corporations and the
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prominent rival to Delaware. for corporations, New York has a veil-piercing
doctrine described as "nearly impregnable." 2 09 This characterization would
seem to be at odds with the 49.8 1% veil-piercing rate, but federal and state
courts apply somewhat different tests for New York. 2 10 Federal courts in
New York, which pierce 56.41% of the time, appear to apply the common
alter ego test that requires proof of control or domination, as well as fraud or
inequity;211 in contrast, New York's state courts, which pierce 42.76% of the
time, appear to require an additional prong of "perversion of the privilege to
do business in a corporate form" that is a seeming tribute to their legendary
jurist, Cardozo. 2 12 Ohio's 55.87% veil-piercing rate is considerably simpler
to explain, as courts apply a fairly liberal standard that does not require proof
of actual or constructive fraud.2 13 What is perhaps most notable about the
jurisdiction is the discrepancy between the mere fourteen cases applying

Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REv. 661, 679-80 ("California, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, New
York, and Texas each have statutes that provide for the automatic enforcement of choice-of-law
clauses that designate the state's law in high value contracts."). Pennsylvania and Texas both
feature a rate lower than the total dataset. When Pennsylvania law is applied, 44.44% of claims
prevail, which suggests the "strong presumption" against veil-piercing professed by the state's
Supreme Court may be aspirational. Lumax Indus., Inc. v. Aultman, 669 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1995).
Cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a comparatively paltry
30.77% rate in 65 pre-1986 Pennsylvania cases). Moreover, the jurisdiction features an unsettled
and unclear test, which has been described as "somewhat obscure." PRESSER, supra note 1, § 2:42,
at 2-496; see also Good v. Holstein, 787 A.2d 426, 430 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) ("[T]here appears to
be no clear test or well settled rule in Pennsylvania . .. as to exactly when the corporate veil can be
pierced. .. ."); First Realvest, Inc. v. Avery Builders, Inc., 600 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
("[T]here is no definitive test for piercing the corporate veil."). When Texas law is applied, 40.76%
of claims prevail, although that jurisdiction has taken distinct approaches over time. See infra notes
214-28 and accompanying text; cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6
(finding a 34.91% rate in 106 pre-1986 Texas cases).
209. William D. Harrington, Business Associations, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 25, 65 (1992); see
also William Wrigley Jr. Co. v. Waters, 890 F.2d 594, 600 (2d Cir. 1989) ("It is well settled that
New York courts are reluctant to disregard the corporate entity.").
210. By comparison, Thompson found a 34.91% rate in 212 pre-1986 cases, but he does not
provide federal and state splits. Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6. The
difference in New York federal and state courts also is manifest in their piercing rates based on the
type of the shareholders. New York federal courts reach into the assets of an individual shareholder
(70.49%) far more frequently than those of corporate parents (46.43%); these rates are both
considerably higher than those of the state courts, which also reach into the assets of individual
shareholders (48.67%) far more frequently than those of corporate parents (25.64%).
211. See, e.g., David v. Glemby Co., 717 F. Supp. 162, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (describing New
York's two-part test).
212. See, e.g., Guptill Holding Corp. v. State, 307 N.Y.S.2d 970, 973 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)
("Incorporations are, however, subject to 'tests of honesty and justice' and will be ignored if a
'perversion of the privilege to do business in a corporate form.' . . . Another factor looked to ... is
complete dominion and control .... ); supra note 204.
213. See, e.g., Belvedere Condo. Unit Owners' Ass'n v. R.E. Roark Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1075,
1086 (Ohio 1993) (adopting the rule announced in Bucyrus-Erie Co. v. Gen. Prods. Corp., 643 F.2d
413, 419 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that "[tihough fraud is a frequent ground for application of the
alter ego doctrine, it is not essential")). The veil-piercing rate for individual versus corporate
shareholders approximates the overall dataset.
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Ohio law in Thompson's study and the fifty-two observations in this dataset
over the same time frame. 2 14
Finally, Texas provides an interesting case study of different approaches
to veil-piercing. Prior to 1986, Texas courts applied essentially an alter ego
test, plus a catchall "exceptional situations" 2 15 provision that was criticized as
so "difficult to describe" 216 as to be "almost totally useless," 2 17 not to mention interpreted expansively by courts. 2 18 At the same time, courts also
seemed to place inordinate emphasis on whether a defendant corporation had
failed to follow basic formalities 219 or commingled affairs or assets, 22 0
contributing to the jurisdiction's overall reputation as relatively "lenient" for
veil-piercing plaintiffs.22 1
In 1986 this leniency reached its apex. The Supreme Court of Texas
ruled in Castleberry v. Branscum22 2 that veil-piercing would be justified
when there was evidence of an inequitable result, even when corporate formalities had been observed and commingling was absent. 22 3 Alternatively,
and more significantly, a request for veil-piercing grounded in either
Contract or Tort could prevail by demonstrating that the defendant
corporation was a sham used to perpetuate merely constructive, and not

214. See Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1051 tbl.6 (finding a 57.14% rate in

14 pre-1986 cases). The veil-piercing rate for Ohio law in the present study is roughly comparable
over Thompson's time frame (55.77%) as well as the remaining period (55.91%), but the
considerably larger number of Ohio observations (among other jurisdictions) in this dataset
certainly contributes to the two studies' different overall rates.
215. See, e.g., Bell Oil & Gas Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 431 S.W.2d 336, 339 n.3, 340 (Tex.
1968) (observing that "'individual officers, directors or stockholders"' will not be held liable
"'except where it appears that the individuals are using the corporate entity as a sham to perpetuate
a fraud, to avoid personal liability, avoid the effect of a statute, or in a few other exceptional
situations"' (quoting Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340, 351 (Tex. 1955))).
216.

1 IRA P. HILDEBRAND, THE LAW OF TEXAS CORPORATIONS 43 (1942).

217. Robert W. Hamilton, The CorporateEntity, 49 TEXAS L. REv. 979, 982 (1971).
218. See, e.g., Bell, 431 S.W.2d at 340 (noting that an arrangement that "in all probability will
result in prejudice to those dealing with one or more of the units . . .or one which has actually
resulted in the complaining party's having been placed in a position of disadvantage" easily would
suffice); First Nat'l Bank v. Gamble, 132 S.W.2d 100, 103 (Tex. 1939) (finding that "an adherence
to the fiction of the separate existence . .. would, under the particular circumstances, sanction a
fraud or promote injustice").
219. See, e.g., Coastal Shutters & Insulation, Inc. v. Derr, 809 S.W.2d 916, 921 (Tex. App.
Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (listing "the degree to which the corporate formalities are
followed" as the first of four factors used to establish an "alter ego" claim).
220. See, e.g., State v. Swift & Co., 187 S.W.2d 127, 131-32 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1945,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (describing the role of the courts in policing commingled stock ownership and
corporate management as protecting "public convenience" and enforcing laws).
221. See, e.g., Minchen v. Van Trease, 425 S.W.2d 435, 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1968, writ ref'd) (observing that Texas courts are more lenient than other jurisdictions as to
veil-piercing).
222. 721 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1986).
223. Id. at 271 (citing Bell, 431 S.W.2d at 340, as well as analogous applications to fiduciary
duties, fraudulent transfers, and trust funds). Notably, the cited portion of Bell contains absolutely
no mention of corporate formalities.
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224,,225

actual, fraud.224 The ensuing "uproar in the business community"
eventually triggered a nullificatory reaction by the state legislature, which
amended Article 2.21A of the Texas Business Corporation Act, effective
August 28, 1989, to reinstate a requirement of actual fraud against only
Contract creditors.226
These events have had a significant impact on veil-piercing cases. Prior
to Castleberry38.83% of all veil-piercing opinions under Texas law resulted
in success, which indicates that the jurisdiction's reputation for leniency was
unfounded.227 But this overall rate exploded to 60.00% during the three
years after the decision, and has retreated to 40.22% since the enactment of
Article 2.21A up to and including 2006.

224. Id. at 273. The court had previously distinguished constructive fraud from actual fraud:
"Actual fraud usually involves dishonesty of purpose or intent to deceive, whereas constructive
[F]raud is the breach of some legal or equitable duty which, irrespective of moral guilt, the law
declares fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate confidence, or to injure
public interests." Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 740 (Tex. 1964). But see Castleberry, 721
S.W.2d at 277-78 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) ("This standard is so broad that it is not a standard. It
fails to provide any guidance on the necessary elements to assert a cause of action under this
theory.... In his attempt to disregardthe corporateentity in this case, Castleberryonly pleaded an

alter ego theory."). According to the slim majority, the failure to plead a sham theory was not fatal
because "the purpose in disregarding the corporate fiction . . . 'should not be thwarted by adherence
to any particular theory of liability."' Id. at 273 (majority opinion) (quoting Gentry v. Credit Plan
Corp., 528 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. 1975)).
225. Farr v. Sun World Say. Ass'n, 810 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
226. Act of May 12, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 217, § 1, 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 974, 974-75.
Due to some apparent confusion about the applicability of Article 2.21 to theories that were not
identified explicitly, the Texas legislature further amended 2.21(A)(2) in 1993 to include "the alter
ego of the corporation" or some "other similar theory" as invalid grounds for imposing shareholder
liability. Act of May 7, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 215, § 2.05(A)(2), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 418,
446; see also W. Horizontal Drilling, Inc. v. Jonnet Energy Corp., 11 F.3d 65, 69 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994)
("[T]he Texas Supreme Court seems to be ignoring the amendments to article 2.21 and continues to
permit a failure to observe corporate formalities as a means of proving alter ego."). Further, even
though explicitly concerned with only Contracts, the provision also was applied to certain Torts.
See, e.g., Menetti v. Chavers, 974 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, no pet.) ("[T]he
actual fraud requirement should be applied, by analogy, to [T]ort claims, especially those arising
from contractual obligations."). In an effort to "curb the creativity of the bench and the bar,"
Alan W. Tompkins & Ted S. O'Neal, Corporationsand Limited Liability Companies, 51 SMU L.

REv. 817, 825 (1998), the legislature again amended 2.21 by adding "any matter relating to or
arising from the obligation" to "any contractual obligation." Act of May 13, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 375, § 7(A)(2), 1997 Tex. Gen. Laws 1516, 1522.
227. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
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Figure 3. Texas Veil-Piercing, Castleberryto Article 2.2 1A2 2 8
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Most interestingly, the post-Castleberry rate of veil-piercing claims in
Contract is lower than before the decision. During the three years between
the decision and Article 2.21A there was only one case involving a Tort
claim. Castleberry's liberalization of the requirements for veil-piercing in
Contract thus may have incentivized litigants to recharacterize Tort claims
when possible, but the overall paucity of cases combined with an extremely
short time frame limits the reliability of the data for Tort, and, to an extent,
for all other claims during that span.2 29 Nevertheless, the data support a story
of how changes to a jurisdiction's veil-piercing standard can affect litigant
behavior and success.
C. Reclaiming the Substantive Divide
Due to its remedial nature, a veil-piercing request must be couched in a
substantive cause of action.230 Particular caution should be exercised with
any data about substantive claims, however, as they feature a layer of ambi-

228. There are only two veil-piercing claims grounded in the corporation statute. See TEX.
BUS. ORGS. CODE § 21.223(a)(1), (b) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Regular and First Called
Sessions) (codifying Article 2.21A as effective January 1, 2010).
229. Between Castleberry and Article 2.21A there were only fifteen veil-piercing observations,
of which eleven were in Contract and four were in Fraud. Ironically, Castleberry appears to have
elevated the prominence of fraud or misrepresentation as an instrumental rationale. Prior to the
decision, that rationale was relied upon infrequently, with only 45 observations and a 26.67%
success rate. During the three years after the decision, however, the frequency of the rationale
disproportionately increased to 8 observations with a 75.00% success rate. And after Article
2.21A's enactment, courts found fraud or misrepresentation to be instrumental in 38 cases, with
litigants prevailing 44.74% of the time; when an ambiguous or general reference to fraud or deceit
was instrumental, piercing occurred in 29.63% of cases, versus 66.67% or 100.00% when specific
evidence of fraud concerning assets or identity, respectively, was instrumental.
230. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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guity in addition to selection effects. 2 3 1 Not only are substantive claims
subject to discretionary selection and characterization by litigants, but their
sources can vary across jurisdictions. Specifically, certain kinds of Contract,
Criminal, Fraud, and Tort claims can originate from, and even coexist in, the
common law or statutes. 232 To an extent this issue has been addressed by
coding all types of claims connected to veil-piercing, but no attempt has been
made here to control even basic jurisdictional differences.
In line with the overall trend,233 the frequency of each type of
substantive claim increased over time, with a sharp rise beginning in the
1970s. As in Thompson's study, veil-piercing claims arise in Contract more
than in any other substantive claim. 2 34
Table 7. Veil-Piercing by Claim and Jurisdiction
n
Claim
1730
Contract
408
Federal
1322
State
Criminal
48
10
Federal
38
State
400
Fraud
157
Federal
243
State
897
Statut e
383
Federal
-514
State
377
Tort
129
Federal
248
State

V-P Rate (%)
46.24
42.65
47.35

66.67
50.00

71.05
61.00

_

___

1

53.50
65.84
49.50
50.65
48.64
47.75

48.06
47.58

This comports with available data on nationwide filings for all types of
claims, veil-piercing or otherwise.23 5 Since 1990, however, a surge in all

231. See supra notes 143-51 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Egudin v. Carriage Court Condo., 528 So. 2d 1043, 1044 (La. Ct. App.
(addressing fraud); People ex rel. Potter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 224 N.W. 438, 438-40 (Mich.
(addressing public utility contracts); Covelli v. Jackson, 700 N.Y.S.2d 341 (N.Y. App. Div.
(addressing negligent automotive repair); Ex parte Chambers, 898 S.W.2d 257, 258 (Tex.
(addressing criminal contempt).
233. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
234. Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1058 tbl.9.
235. See supra note 160.

1988)
1929)
1999)
1995)
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such Tort filings within federal court has resulted in their outnumbering
Contract claims, which have been declining.2 36
Civil veil-piercing claims prevail most often when couched in Fraud.
The veil-piercing rate for Fraud exceeds that of any other type of civil substantive claim, in federal or state court as well as across all levels of courts.
Table 8. Veil-Piercing by Claim and Court
n
Claim
1730
Contract
281
Trial
1119
Intermediate Appellate
336
Supreme
48
Criminal
Trial
5
31
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme

Fraud
Trial
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme
Statute
Trial
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme
Tort
Trial
Intermediate Appellate
Supreme

V-P Rate (%)
46.24
48.04
45.13
47.02
66.67
60.00
58.06
91.67

12

400

61.00

57.73
56.49
79.10

97
239
67

49.50

897
53.51
46.24
51.14

271
452
176

47.75

377
91
224
63

53.85
44.20
47.62

Indeed, when Fraud is paired with another civil substantive claim, there is
markedly more veil-piercing success than with that claim alone. 2 37 And,
notably, subclaims for Fraud that can be characterized as Contract, such as
Fraudulent Misrepresentation, feature lower veil-piercing rates than their
counterparts for Tort, such as Deceit.238

236. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 160.
237. See infra Table 9.
238. See infra Table 10.
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Table 9. Veil-Piercing by Combinations of Claims
n
Claim
1393
Contract
Criminal
77
Fraud
Statute

__

707

215
1
155
125
44
6
38
2

Tort
Contract-Criminal
Contract-Fraud
Contract-Statute
Contract-Tort
Criminal-Fraud
Criminal-Statute
Criminal-Tort
Fraud-Statute
Fraud-Tort
Statute-Tort
Contract-Fraud-Tort

V-P Rate (%)
45.37
100.00
83.12
47.95
44.65
100.00
57.42
42.40
45.45
66.67

63.16
100.00
53.54

99

56.86

51
53
12

52.83
41.67

Veil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than Contract. Although
slight, the disparity also holds in federal and state courts. 239 And this result is
produced by the law in 60.78% of all jurisdictions.
Figure 4. Tort v. Contract Veil-Piercing RateS240

NH
VT

A
I
PA

IN
VA

MO
-

A
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DDE
MD

sc
GA
FL

L

mToro>Contract
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239. See infra Table 7. The disparity also holds true for both trial and supreme courts. See
infra Table 8. The results for intermediate appellate courts should be discounted, as they depend
heavily on state cases from an incomplete database. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
240. Puerto Rico is the only nonstate whose rate in Tort (66.67%) exceeds Contract (50.00%).
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The law from all the shaded states produces higher veil-piercing rates in Tort
than Contract. There is no apparent connection between overall laxity in
veil-piercing and whether that jurisdiction's law results in more success in
Tort than Contract; the proportion of jurisdictions whose law results in
piercing in excess of the overall rate is almost evenly divided between
shaded and nonshaded states.241
These results do not square with Thompson's findings. Over his
original time frame the veil-piercing rate for Tort was 52.94% versus 45.90%
for Contract. And these disparities cannot be explained by Thompson's
omission of Fraud. When the various subclaims for Fraud are recharacterized as either a Contract or Tort claim, 24 2 the gap between the veil-piercing
rates prior to 1986 becomes even greater: 61.68% for Tort versus 47.23% for
Contract; that gap remains over this entire dataset's time frame: 54.34% for
Tort versus 47.23% for Contract. 2 43 The identity of rates in Contract across
these time frames makes clear that veil-piercing litigants have been experiencing less success in Tort over the past two decades.24 4
This trend in Tort is apparent even in the main dataset, where Fraud
claims are segregated. From 1986 up to and including 2006, veil-piercing
claims actually prevail less in Tort, 43.48%, than Contract, 46.56%.245 One
plausible explanation is that Thompson's findings have altered litigation
patterns, but only a handful of reported cases have cited the perplexing
asymmetry, much less relied upon it, in deciding whether to pierce in
Contract or Tort. 24 6 Another possibility is that Thompson's time frame
coincides with some inflection point, but there is no discernable fork over the
past three decades in the veil-piercing rates for Contract or Tort. A large part
of this puzzle may lie in Fraud, whose veil-piercing rate has decreased con-

241. The most interesting state in this regard is Virginia, which features an extremely low
piercing rate and yet favors piercing in Contract over Tort. Because of the paucity of cases, "[i]t is
clearly more difficult in Virginia than in its neighboring jurisdictions to grasp the state's piercing
doctrine." Epperson & Canny, supra note 193, at 632.
242. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Material Misrepresentation and Innocent
Misrepresentation subclaims were recharacterized as Contract, while Common Law Fraud or Deceit
and Negligent Misrepresentation subclaims were recharacterized as Tort; Fraudulent
Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer subclaims were equally divided into Contract and Tort.
To be sure, this is an imprecise way to reverse engineer Thompson's coding, particularly because of
the presumed indifference between Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer claims;
recalibrating the allocation, however, seems unlikely to alter the gap, given its considerable size.
243. For these recharacterized claims, the veil-piercing rate for Tort exceeds the rate for
Contract in federal or state court, as well as against an individual or corporate shareholder.
244. This is not inconsistent with Thompson's speculation that "change in [P]roduct-[L]iability
law and [T]ort law generally in recent decades may have led plaintiffs to bring suits that go beyond
prior law." Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1069.
245. But cf supra Figure 4 (indicating that veil-piercing claims prevail more often in Tort than
in Contract in the majority ofjurisdictions).
246. See Theberge v. Darbro, Inc., 684 A.2d 1298, 1303 (Me. 1996) ("The distinction between
[C]ontract and [T~ort creditors . . . breaks down when the debtor engages in fraud or
misrepresentation.").
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siderably over the past few decades.247 The reason for this decrease is not
clear and bears further investigation. At the very least, veil-piercing in Fraud
does seem to correlate more strongly with that in Tort, as compared to
Contract, and thus seems to have some distortive effect on Thompson's
finding.
Moreover, veil-piercing is not rooted within inequitable bargains.248
Comparing types of contracting parties as a proxy for relative sophistication
reveals no appreciable difference in veil-piercing when a bargain involves
only organizations, versus an organization with an individual.2 4 9
Table 10. Veil-Piercing by Claim and Subclaim
Claim
n
1730
Contract
678
Individual-Organization
Organization-Organization
1052
Criminal48
400
Fraud
111
Fraud/Deceit
Fraudulent Misrepresentation 104
161
Fraudulent Transfer
Innocent Misrepresentation
2
5
Material Misrepresentation
Negligent Misrepresentation
17
897
Statute
21
Antitrust
Arbitration
3
107
Bankruptcy
Conmmerci n
49
Constitution
15
38
Corporation
Criminal
35
Discrimination
7
26
Environmental
ERISA/Social Security
33

V-P Rate (%)
46.24
45.43
46.77
66.67
61.00

68.47
53.85
67.08
0.00
20.00
17.65
49.50
42.86

33.33
49.53
61.22
33.33
44.74

68.57
14.29
61.54
66.67
(continued)

247. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 222-27; supra Figure 3. Certainly, another part
of the puzzle may lie in the choice of exclusions, multiplicity of claims, and coding of cases.
248. See infra Table 10 (indicating that the veil-piercing rates for Contract claims between
organizations, and between individuals and organizations, are 46.77% and 45.43% respectively).
249. To be sure, interorganizational contracting does not necessarily involve less disparate
sophistication levels than those between organizations and individuals. A better measure would be
to discern the amount of financial resources, quality of business expertise and legal counsel, as well
as the specific contract terms; even if such data could be obtained, a reliable metric would be
difficult to formulate. In any event, the endgame suggests no material difference.
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Table 10 (cont.). Veil-Piercing by Claim and Subclaim
V-P Rate (%)
Claim
n
38
60.53
Fraudulent Transfer
Health
3
33.33
19
36.84
Housing
40.00
Insurance
15
Intellectual Property
34
47.06
Lahor
48
37.50
28
46.43
Licensing
16
43.75
Liquor
46
56.52
Marital
Maritime
13
30.77
22
45.45
Other
22
54.55
Real Property
49
44.90
Remedial
19
42.11
Securities
42
42.85
Tax
35
42.86
Trust & Estate
Unfair/Deceptive Trade
58
68.97
12
41.67
Usury
Utility
27
40.74
Workers' Compensation
32
46.88
47.75
377
Tort
15
20.00
Intentional Tort-Person
72
Intentional Tort-Property
59.72
242
45.04
Negligence
22
36.36
Products Liability
44
Tortious Interference w/ K
54.55
Indeed, piercing occurs more often against interorganizational bargains not
only overall, but also across federal and state courts, and irrespective of
whether the controlling shareholder is an individual or a corporate parent;
this seems to dispel any sort of judicial predisposition to utilizing veilpiercing as an equitable shield for individual creditors from corporate
wrongs. This, however, may somewhat reflect that parties with potentially
superior stakes and resources will seek an advantage, such as higher quality
legal services; although the veil-piercing rates are quite comparable overall
for the different types of bargains, corporate parents do enjoy a bit more
success defending themselves against claims by an individual Contract
creditor than by another organization.250

250. Piercing occurs against corporate parents 40.91% of the time with interorganizational
bargains versus 36.37% with individual-organization bargains. The rates against individual
shareholders are comparable for the different types of bargains.
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The results for specific subclaims in Tort are mixed. By a large margin,
veil-piercing claims most frequently were couched in Negligence, 25 I but that
veil-piercing rate was considerably lower than that for Torts against Property
or Tortious Interference with Contract, both of which require proof of
intent.252 The disparity in rates can be traced to the type of shareholder. As
with the overall dataset, Negligence claims far more often result in judicial
reaching into the assets of individual shareholders than those of corporate
parents. 253 In contrast, when presented with an Intentional Tort against
Property or Interference with a Contract, courts pierce with comparable
frequency against both types of shareholders; 25 4 one plausible explanation
may be that requiring evidence of deliberate tortious activity quells judicial
concern about whether a corporate parent has an interest in or control over its
subsidiary.25 5
Individual shareholders, though, remain more vulnerable than corporate
parents for each and every substantive claim overall.
Figure 5. Veil-Piercing by Claim and Shareholder Type

70
60
50

30

20

0

Contract

Criminal

Statute
Fraud
0 Person

Tort

U Entity

The bars represent the overall veil-piercing rate for each type of claim, each
of which is divided by the proportion due to piercing of corporate parents

251. Cf KEETON ET AL., supra note 136, § 105, at 725 ("A great many of the common and
familiar forms of negligent conduct ... are in their essence nothing more than
misrepresentation .... ).
252. The distinction is not crisp as Intentional Torts Against Person feature a paltry 20.00%
veil-piercing rate, but that result is quite unreliable given the miniscule number of cases.
253. Veil-piercing claims in Negligence succeed 51.88% against individuals versus 31.33%
against corporate parents.
254. For Torts against Property, veil-piercing claims prevail slightly more often against an
individual (62.00%) than against an entity (54.55%); for Tortious Interference with a Contract,
claims prevail 54.55% of the time against either type of shareholder.
255. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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versus individuals; Statute and Tort claims thus feature a comparatively
higher proportion of success against corporate parents. In absolute terms,
though, the veil-piercing rate against corporate parents is slightly higher in
Contract than Tort.256

-

Table 11. Veil-Piercing by Claim and Shareholder Type 257
V-P Rate (%)
n
Claim
46.24
1730
Contract
39.96
458
Entity
48.58
1268
Person
66.67
48
Criminal
50.00
8
Entity
70.00
40
Person
Entity
Person
Statute
Entity

71
328

Person

573

54.93
62.50
49.50

897
41.51

318

53.93

377

Tort

Entity
Person

61.00

400

Fraud

144
233

47.75

37.50
54.08

This seems in line with economic arguments about veil-piercing generating
potentially perverse incentives in Tort for corporate parents that can organize
as separate ventures. 258 But such arguments may be imputing too much to

256. See infra Table 11.
257. This Table omits government shareholders.
258. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 18, at 111 (presenting a hypothetical about
taxi firms apparently inspired by the classic enterprise liability case, Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223
N.E.2d 6 (N.Y. 1966), in which veil-piercing would favor smaller, unaffiliated firms that have an
incentive to carry minimal insurance: "[p]otential victims of torts would not gain from a legal rule
that promoted corporate dis-integration"). If this account is correct, the results are not inconsistent
with there being a considerable number of veil-piercing claims in Tort concerning that type of
competitive context. But see Harvey Gelb, Limited Liability Policy and Veil Piercing, 9 WYo. L.

REV. 551, 565-68 (2009) (arguing generally that "the perspective [that] courts in piercing the veil
should be more hostile to [C]ontract creditors than [T]ort creditors may be fashionable in some
quarters ... but it is actually inappropriate," specifically because, inter alia, "courts have been
reluctant to pierce entity veils" and "[p]rotecting [C]ontract creditors against egregious behavior by
withdrawing the limited liability shield. . . should be the norm and not the exception"). Gelb's
arguments rely heavily on observations that are at odds with the findings here and, in any event,
prove too much as they ultimately aim to supplant the Contract-Tort distinction with an
amorphously broad equitable test that would generate mixed incentives and costly uncertainty.
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courts, as evidenced by their divergence from such views with respect to
piercing individual versus corporate shareholders.259
Although highly frequent, Statute claims are very context dependent.
The Statute data was divided into thirty different subtypes, which feature
considerably variable veil-piercing rates. The exclusions applied to cases
involving Arbitration, Bankruptcy,
Discrimination, Environmental,
ERISA/Social Security, Labor, Tax, Trust and Estate, and Workers'
Compensation statutes concern substantively distinct analogies to veilpiercing,260 and thus there are still some cases involving the classic corporate
doctrine. Only the claims couched in Environmental and ERISA/Social
Security statutes feature a rate higher than the overall dataset; this may be
due to the Environmental claims involving a disproportionate amount of corporate torts, and a tendency toward construing ERISA/Social Security
provisions liberally in favor of the beneficiary. 2 6 1 Not surprisingly, the largest share of Statute cases belongs to Bankruptcy, as insolvency is a natural
complement to veil-piercing.2 62 Notably, Commercial and Unfair or
Deceptive Trade statutes account for a sizable share, which may be due to
their being an alternative to Contract claims; their veil-piercing rates, though,
are among the highest for Statutes and considerably higher than those for
Contract claims.
D. Mapping the Wilderness ofJudicialReasons
A plethora of reasons is at the disposal of courts to support their
decision whether to pierce. Courts may cite just the conclusory metaphorical
aspects of the alter ego or instrumentality test.2 63 Alternatively, courts simply
may recite the litany of fact-specific factors, even when the factors are

259. See supranotes 169-73 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 124-28, 130-32 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., Leddy v. Standard Drywall, Inc., 875 F.2d 383, 388 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding an
officer-shareholder liable for required contributions under ERISA due to ERISA's legislative
purpose, despite "the traditional conditions for piercing the corporate veil ... not [being] met");
Lucia Ann Silecchia, Pinningthe Blame & Piercingthe Veil in the Mists ofMetaphor: The Supreme
Court's New Standards for the CERCLA Liability of Parent Companies and a Proposalfor

Legislative Reform, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 118 (1998) ("[Clourts repeatedly face plaintiffs
seeking to hold parent corporations liable for the CERCLA responsibilities of their subsidiaries.
This has been justified primarily as an effort to cast a wide net for responsible parties and achieve
CERCLA's oft-touted broad remedial purposes.").
262. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 85, at 542 n.98 ("As is often said, a fraudulent conveyance is
but the reflex of an insolvent man."). But see, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, The Problem of the Insolvent

Heir, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 621 n.164 (1989) ("Courts have not, however, been willing to
pierce the corporate veil in [T]ort cases where the sole justification for doing so is involuntary
insolvency.").
263. See, e.g., Mesler v. Bragg Mgmt. Co., 702 P.2d 601, 607 (Cal. 1985) ("The essence of the
alter ego doctrine is that justice be done. 'What the formula comes down to, once shorn of verbiage
about control, instrumentality, agency, and corporate entity, is that liability is imposed to reach an
equitable result."' (citation omitted)).
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attenuated from the underlying harm. 2 64 A factor's mere mention, however,
is not necessarily reflective of a court's actual deliberations. As a result, a
simple tally of factors appearing in decisions may provide an optical illusion,
rather than an accurate portrait, of the reasons why veil-piercing succeeds.
This study presents two angles to the ratio decidendi of veil-piercing.
The frequency data indicate the relative popularity of an instrumental rationale in veil-piercing decisions. And the veil-piercing rate data indicate the
relative value of that rationale, as its absence or presence in a case depended
on the veil-piercing claim's success.

F

Table 12. Veil-Piercing by Rationale
Rationale
n
152
Agency
197
Alter Ego
104
Assumption of Risk
584
Commingling
7
Advertising
440
Assets
8
Contracts
Directors
115
41
Employees
79
Officers
29
Records
Retirement Plans
0
7
Stationery
40
Taxes
787
Domination
Fraud/Misrepresentation
989
262
Fraud/Deceit
97
Assets
129
Identity
354
Informalities
124
Meetings
146
Records
156
Other

V-P Rate (%)
52.63

62.94
3.85

61.30
71.43
58.64
62.50

69.57
75.61
7215
48.28

71.43
50.00
66.58
38.62

j

61.30

-I

27.48
62.87
65.12

64.52
67.12
55.77
(continued)

264. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Table 12 (cont.). Veil-Piercing by Rationale
Rationale
n
890
Injustice/Unfairness
143
Instrumentality
Sham/Shell
286
278
Siphoning of Funds
251
Statutory Policy
411
Undercapitalization
42
Incorporation
Post-Incorporation
376
Other
_550 _

[Vol. 89:81

V-P Rate (%)
51.35

61.54
60.14
73.74
51.39

61.56
64.29
61.97
33.45

J

For instance, assumption of risk accounts for only 1.74% of the total number
of observations for instrumental rationales, which reflects its disfavor as a
justification; the 3.85% veil-piercing rate reflects that the rationale overwhelmingly functions to justify a decision not to pierce.
There are no surprises about the five most popular instrumental
The top three-fraud or misrepresentation, injustice or
rationales.
unfairness, and domination-all commonly appear in veil-piercing tests, and
are among the most compelling rationales within academic and practical
commentary. 2 6 5 Similarly, there has been a durable belief about the relevance of commingling and undercapitalization to veil-piercing.266
All of these rationales also are the most popular in veil-piercing claims
grounded in Contract, Fraud, or Tort.

265. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:6, at 1-31 ("It was not enough, then, for Powell, for the
subsidiary to be utterly dominated by the parent. In addition, there must be some 'injustice'
perpetrated. . .. "); Rutheford B. Campbell, Limited Liabilityfor CorporateShareholders: Myth or

Matter-of-Fact, 63 KY. L.J. 23, 37-39 (1975) ("[S]ome element of control seems indispensable to
the disregard of the corporate entity."); Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1045 n.58,
1063 tbl.11, 1066 (reporting both domination and misrepresentation to be among the most
frequently mentioned rationales, while reporting unfairness to be a commonly mentioned rationale
that does not, however, rank among the top five); supra note 99 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 216, at 985 ("The [Texas] courts often stress two factorsinadequate capitalization and the commingling of shareholder and corporate affairs-when
determining whether shareholders should be held responsible for claims against their corporation.").
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Figure 6. Frequency of Rationales for Certain Claims
Commingling

I
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U Fraud

15

10
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20

E Contract

This figure depicts how frequently a rationale was instrumental as a
percentage of each claim's total number of rationale observations. The
proportions for all these rationales are strikingly similar in Tort and
Contract.267 This is most surprising with respect to undercapitalization,26 8
which some believe to be far more relevant in Tort than Contract.269

267. See infra Table 13.
268. Cf Thompson, EmpiricalPiercing,supra note 20, at 1066 ("in both contexts [(Contract
and Tort)] courts refused to pierce in 25 to 30% of the cases even when undercapitalization was
present. . . ."),
269. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, CorporateStrategic Reaction to Mass Tort, 72 VA. L. REv. 1, 44
n.123 (1986) ("An undercapitalization requirement may make good sense in some nontort,
contractual settings."); supra notes 28, 107 and accompanying text.
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Table 13. Veil-Piercing by Rationale and Claim
Contract Criminal
Fraud
Rationale
49.48
100.00
36.36
Agency
61.11
50.00
71.88
Alter Ego
100.00
3.16
k
0.00
Assumption of Ris
100.00
56.15
65.15
Commingling
66.81
89.47
70.30
Domination
34.75
67.76
83.33
Fraud/Misrep.
61.92
0.00
69.44
Informalities
67.01
87.50
Injustice/Unfairnes ;s 50.71
100.00
73.33
Instrumentality
60.26
60.57
75.00
Sham/Shell
75.00
74.29
Siphoning of Fund s 69.84
75.00
44.83
47.06
60.00
Statutory Policy
61.02
0.00
Undercapitalizatio i 61.79
18.18
33.53
47.62
Other
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Statute

52.94
62.32
10.00
65.27

70.17
38.55

56.47
49.20
61.11
60.56
77.97
51.41

59.55
30.99

Tort
40.91

67.86
0.00
65.85
54.87
40.95
56.25

54.95
61.90
46.51
75.86
40.00
60.78
29.55

Evidence of fraud or misrepresentation is the most popular rationale
overall. The rationale is instrumental with comparable frequency in Contract
and Tort, in line with commentary. 2 70 But the rationale is instrumental in
only 45.75% of cases involving Fraud, which may be due to courts focusing
on the claim rather than the evidence to justify veil-piercing.27 1
Popularity is not everything, however, and some of the less frequent
instrumental rationales merit attention. Despite their conclusory nature, alter
ego and instrumentality do not appear with much frequency overall.272 And
agency does not rank highly among the rationales, despite being a doctrinal
precursor to veil-piercing and receiving considerable attention as a potential
substitute for at least Contract claims; 273 the rationale seems to be comparably relevant to both Contract and Tort. In contrast courts not surprisingly
cite assumption of risk far more often in Contract than Tort.
The mean veil-piercing rate for all observations of instrumental
rationales is 53.16%.274 Fraud or misrepresentation features among the

270. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
271. Cf, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 31 ("Clearly, if the plaintiff ... had a good
fraud claim he would plead it .... ).
272. See, e.g., HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS

§ 136,

at 312

(rev. ed. 1946) ("All corporations are used as business instrumentalities.").
273. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 216, at 983-94 ("[N]o conceptual problems emerge when
liability is imposed upon shareholders under conventional theories of [A]gency or [T]ort law.").
But see, e.g., Millon, supra note 16, at 1331 ("Ifthe courts ... are serious about a finding of agency,
there is no need to consider veil piercing at all."); infra note 290.
274. This varies from the overall veil-piercing rate of 48.51% due to the increased number of
observations.
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lowest rates, which seems to indicate that the rationale asserts itself most
strongly in decisions not to pierce. But the particularized results tell a different story. Ambiguous or general references to the rationale result in piercing
only 27.48% of the time; in contrast, specific evidence of fraud or misrepresentation as to assets or identity justifies piercing, respectively, 62.87% or
65.12% of the time. 275 These results indicate that, whether the jurisdiction's
test explicitly requires proof, fraud or misrepresentation is a significant consideration for courts; its general absence is highly instrumental in deciding
not to pierce, while specific evidence translates into superior odds for
successful veil-piercing.
Even more fascinating, though, is what happens when evidence of fraud
or misrepresentation is not instrumental. In such cases there is essentially a
substitution effect: the veil-piercing rates for the other most instrumental rationales all increase.
Figure 7. Veil-Piercing Rates for Rationales
in Relation to Fraud/Misrepresentation
commingling
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The effect is most pronounced for injustice or unfairness, where the veilpiercing rate leaps to 64.27% when the cases also citing fraud or misrepresentation are excluded. And this effect is far stronger for all of the most
popular rationales within state courts, particularly in the case of domination
(70.81%) and undercapitalization (68.82%). These results circumstantially
suggest that when instrumental, evidence of fraud or misrepresentation asserts itself more strongly than other prominent rationales, even though its
presence alone tends to justify veil-piercing.

275. This pattern applies to claims in both Contract and Tort.
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The results for undercapitalization are also illuminating. On the one
hand, the relatively high veil-piercing rate indicates that the rationale tends to
assert itself more strongly when courts decide to pierce;27 6 this comports with
widely held beliefs about undercapitalization's relevance and utility. 27 7 On
the other hand, the rate is virtually uniform across veil-piercing claims in
Contract, Tort, and Fraud, which may be surprising to some commentators.2 78
Regardless, courts appear to have adjusted their use of the rationale appropriately to reflect the change in capitalization requirements, as attention over
time has shifted from the initial point of incorporation to working amounts,
which are now cited far more frequently. This shift conceptually compleAnd like
ments another prominent rationale, siphoning of funds.
undercapitalization, evidence of a corporation's accounts being pillaged for a
shareholder's benefit is very instrumental in decisions to pierce for all types
of substantive claims.
For the most part, however, the instrumental value of rationales does
vary based on the type of substantive claim. When fraud or misrepresentation concerning a corporation's assets was instrumental in a Tort case,
piercing occurred 90.91% of the time, by far the strongest rationale for any
civil claim; yet fraud or misrepresentation about a shareholder's identity resulted in piercing only 60.00% of the time. Further, this sharp disparity in
veil-piercing rates did not appear in either Contract or Fraud;27 9 although the
number of observations in Tort is quite small, the results may reflect a
distinction in the kinds of fraud or misrepresentation that are most likely to
occur within that context.
The emphasis on assets within Tort is manifest in its other instrumental
rationales. In addition to siphoning of funds and undercapitalization,280 evidence of commingling resulted in a high rate of veil-piercing. These results
contrast with Contract, where commingling is fairly neutral; instead, evidence of domination and a failure to observe formalities were highly
instrumental to a decision to pierce within the bargaining context. 281 For
both Tort and Contract claims, though, veil-piercing claims experience comparably low rates of success when the plaintiff is found to have assumed risk
or there is an absence of general evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.
276. But cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing, supra note 20, at 1063 tbl. 11 (reporting that the
presence of undercapitalization is correlated with decisions to pierce 73.33% of the time, which is
substantially less than numerous other rationales).
277. See supra notes 28, 101-06 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. Cf Thompson, Empirical Piercing,
supra note 20, at 1066 (finding undercapitalization present in only 18.65% of 327 Contract cases
where piercing occurred, versus 12.86% of 70 Tort cases).
279. In Contract, the veil-piercing rates were 63.38% for assets and 62.86% for shareholder; in
Fraud, the rates were 81.82% for assets and 82.6 1%for shareholder.
280. See supra notes 274-76 and accompanying text.
281. Different types of bargains yielded similar veil-piercing rates for domination, but when
there was a failure to observe formalities, the veil-piercing for bargains between individuals and
organizations (70.93%) was considerably higher than that between organizations (56.86%).
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Fraud claims feature the most distinct group of instrumental rationales.
Aside from siphoning of funds as well as specific evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation, courts that decide to pierce predominantly resort to
conclusory metaphors, such as evidence of a defendant corporation being the
sham or shell, mere instrumentality, or alter ego of a controlling
shareholder.282 Such metaphors, along with domination, are common
elements of most veil-piercing tests; accordingly, the results indicate that litigants capable of proving their Fraud claim already may have surpassed the
evidentiary threshold for seeking relief from a controlling shareholder.2 83
The results collectively suggest that different claims do indeed represent
distinct settings for veil-piercing.284 Litigants that seek relief in Contract
experience relatively more success upon proffering a set of evidence:
excessive control, as manifest in domination or a failure to observe corporate
formalities, that has resulted in a financially depleted corporation whose ultimate risk has been distorted by some kind of fraud or misrepresentation. In
contrast, litigants in Tort enjoy superior odds when marshaling evidence
about financial misconduct, with courts apparently recognizing that the element of control may be less relevant in such contexts.285 And when litigants
can meet the requirements for Fraud, they already have gone a considerable
way toward demonstrating a case for veil-piercing. At their core, though, all
substantive claims seem to be more compelling when supported by evidence
that the corporation's inability to satisfy a judgment is due to some kind of
Such evidence seems far more
asset-related abuse or malfeasance.
or unfairness, despite the
injustice
instrumental in decisions to pierce than
latter's resilient popularity.
E. Staking Out the Voluntary-InvoluntaryDebate
The distinction between voluntary and involuntary creditors may strike
some as an "argument from convenience." 2 86 There is a compelling intuition
282. Arguably, sham or shell may be a substitute for fraud or misrepresentation. See, e.g.,
WORMSER, supra note 4, at 59 ("Where a corporation is organized as a mere sham .. . courts, even
without regard to actual fraud, are wont to disregard the entity theory.").
283. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
285. See, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 6 ("The plaintiff may be ... a tort victim who
had no knowledge of the defendant prior to the incident giving rise to his claim.").
286. See PRESSER, supra note 1, § 1:7, at 1-34 to 1-35 ("I have called [economic analysis of
limited liability] the 'argument from convenience' in order to invoke Holmes's theory that the law
at any given time corresponds closely with what is then regarded as 'convenient."'); OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (Little, Brown & Co. reprint) (Mark D. Howe ed.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1st ed. 1881) ("The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly
corresponds ... with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the
degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past."). Although
Presser's comment is directed to orthodox economic treatments of limited liability, this may be
construed more specifically about the economic recasting of the Contract-Tort distinction into one
between voluntary and involuntary creditors. Robert Clark, for instance, dismisses Richard
Posner's analysis of veil-piercing as merely complementary:
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behind enforcing transactions against creditors that have had an ex ante opportunity to assess, bargain, and insure themselves against risk, versus those
that have not.287 While that intuition is commonly articulated for veilpiercing in economic terms, its roots actually lie in traditional doctrinal
analysis. 288 Nevertheless, a few courts apparently refuse to adhere to this
28
distinction,289
which simply makes clear that part of its utility may be
normative.
Less clear, though, are the lines demarcating Contract, Fraud, and
Tort.290 While the asymmetry between Contract and Tort runs throughout the
veil-piercing jurisprudence and literature, the distinction may be conceptually
misdrawn. Reexamining veil-piercing cases in terms of voluntary or involuntary creditors affords an alternative perspective that ultimately may
confirm whether courts indeed perceive differences between civil bargains
and wrongs, and adjudicate them appropriately.
This dataset's coding of specific subclaims provides a unique
opportunity to analyze the creditor distinction. Accordingly, all of the results
were recast. Voluntary creditors comprise all veil-piercing claims in
Contract, Material Misrepresentation, Innocent Misrepresentation, and
Tortious Interference with Contract; all veil-piercing claims in Intentional
Tort (with Person or Property), Negligence, Strict Liability, Common Law
Fraud or Deceit, and Negligent Misrepresentation comprise involuntary

Richard Posner's recent article on veil-piercing ... seems to me ... to constitute an
elaboration and justification, in terms of microeconomic theory, of what I call the
standard initial response to the problem.... In general, though I find Posner's analysis
complementary rather than objectionable . . . and [do] not adopt[] his
emphasis . . . [because] his elaborate arguments seem to me to be directed towards
propositions which, in their essence, have been accepted by judges for decades.
Clark, supra note 85, at 542 n.98; cf Presser, supra note 59, at 157 ("Posner did not rely to any
significant extent on the historical purposes of the doctrine to support his analysis, which appears to
have been implicitly based on the conditions of the modem credit market."). These misgivings
seem to discount the efficiency of the common law hypothesis. See generally R. H. Coase, The
Problem ofSocial Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).

287. See, e.g., Barbara H. Fried, Ex Ante/Ex Post, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 123, 123
(2003) ("No principle of ethics requires that Monte Carlo produce only winners." (quoting J. Mark
Ramseyer & Minoru Nakazato, Tax Transitions and the Protection Racket: A Reply to Professors

Graetz and Kaplow, 75 VA. L. REv. 1155, 1160 (1989))).
288. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 270,

§

137, at 315 ("A voluntary [C]ontract creditor

stands in a somewhat different position from the involuntary [T]ort creditor."); id. § 137, at 315-18
(illustrating how, but for "intermeddling ... in the affairs" of the subsidiary by the parent, or other
"special circumstances," courts will not hold the parent liable on contracts of the subsidiary);
LATTY, supra note 101, § 49, at 201 ("To make the classification [between Tort and Contract
creditors] more significant, the line of distinction should perhaps be drawn between involuntary and
voluntary creditors."); id. § 49, at 201-05 (exploring the intuition behind more strictly limiting the
liability of a parent company for claims against its subsidiaries in Contract than in Tort).
289. See, e.g., Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, 22 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.20 (3d Cir. 1994)
("In some states,... piercing the corporate veil and alter ego actions are allowed to prevent unjust
or inequitable results; they are not based solely on a policy of protecting creditors.").
290. See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 136,

§ 92,

at 655 ("The distinction between [T]ort

and [C]ontract liability .. . has become an increasingly difficult distinction to make.").
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creditors. Fraudulent Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Transfer claims were
divided equally between voluntary and involuntary creditors.
The results evince that veil-piercing claims prevail more often when
they concern an involuntary (52.83%) versus a voluntary (47.50%) creditor.
Although almost three times as frequent as their involuntary counterparts,
voluntary-creditor claims thus virtually mirror the veil-piercing overall rate
of 48.51% for the entire dataset.
Table 14. Veil-Piercing by Creditor and Jurisdiction
V-P Rate (%)
Corporation
n
47.50
Voluntary
1933.5
492
Federal
44.41
1441.5
48.56
State
627.5
52.83
Involuntary
216
Federal
51.16
411.5
State
53.71
And the disparity in veil-piercing rates for voluntary and involuntary
creditors is greater than that for Contract and Tort.
Figure 8. Creditors v. Claims Veil-Piercing Rates
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As with Tort, involuntary-creditor claims present a considerably greater risk
of veil-piercing for individual shareholders than corporate parents.
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Table 15. Veil-Piercing by Creditor and Shareholder Type
Claim
n
V-P Rate (%)
47.50
1933.5
Voluntary
511.5
41.35
Entity
49.82
1420
Person
Involuntary
627.5
52.83
41.45
Entity
171.5
456
Person
57.22
These results collectively suggest that courts may conceptualize veil-piercing
as best suited to prevent a wrong from individual shareholders who externalize unforeseeable risk. Incidentally, this conception is compatible with the
judicial view that corporate parents tend not to be shareholders in the classic

sense. 29 1
The five most popular instrumental rationales for Contract and Tort
remain so in voluntary and involuntary creditor cases: fraud or
misrepresentation, injustice or unfairness, domination, commingling, and
undercapitalization.
Table 16. Veil-Piercing by Rationale and Creditor
n
Rationale
Voluntary

106

Involuntary
Alter Ego

26

Voluntary
Involuntary
Assumption of Risk
Voluntary
Involuntary
Commingling
Voluntary
Involuntary
Domination
Voluntary
Involuntary

47.73

132

Agency

[

V-P Rate (%)
49.06
42.31

172

61.05

58.00
69.15

125
47
104

2.88
3.05
0.00

98.5
5.5

58.79

512
56.19
67.23

391.5
120.5
697
518
179

65.57
66.70
62.29
(continued)

291. See BLUMBERG, supra note 168, at xl (asserting that the advantages of limited liability are
mostly "irrelevant" in the context of corporate parents); Strasser, supra note 169, at 638 (noting that
"different policy issues" are presented by parent companies, and thus "their limited liability should
be determined by a different analysis").
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Table 16 (cont.). Veil-Pi ercing by Rationale and Creditor
V-P Rate (%)
n
Rationale
42.75
952
Fraud/Misrepresentation
716.5
38.38
Voluntary
235.5
56.05
Involuntary
61.56
333
Informalities
257.5
62.52
Voluntary
58.28
75.5
Involuntary
53.85
780
Injustice/Unfairness
611.5
51.76
Voluntary
168.5
61.32
Involuntary
116
62.93
Instrumentality86.5
60.12
Voluntary
29.5
71.19
Involuntary
265
60.75
Sham/Shell
198
62.12
Voluntary
67
56.72
Involuntary
70.38
260
-Siphoning of Funds
206
69.90
Voluntary
54
72.22
Involuntary
49.18
61
Statutory Policy
48.05
38.5
Voluntary
22.5
51.11
Involuntary
406
63.05
Undercapitalization
62.88
308.5
Voluntary
63.59
97.5
Involuntary
513
35.09
Other
379.5
35.44
Voluntary
133.5
34.08
Involuntary

j

-j

And as with the overall dataset, the relative proportion of these rationales
remains roughly the same for both types of creditors. Although not among
the more popular rationales, agency is instrumental in both types of cases
with comparable frequency; this is somewhat surprising in light of the consensual nature of such relationships that also tend to exist in the voluntarycreditor context.292 That dynamic is most apparent in assumption of risk,
whose palpable presence in voluntary-creditor cases becomes almost nonexistent in the involuntary context.
292. But see, e.g., Krendl & Krendl, supra note 12, at 3 n.9 (embracing Learned Hand's
position about the limits of agency principles for veil-piercing purposes: "express agency would not
provide a remedy because the consensual element would be lacking and ... implied agency would
be inappropriate because that would mean the veil would be pierced in every situation").
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The differences are broader and sharper with respect to the veil-piercing
rates. Both injustice or unfairness and commingling assert themselves far
more strongly when courts decide in favor of involuntary creditors; this is
also true for the conclusory metaphors of alter ego and instrumentality, similar to claims in Fraud.293 Conversely, domination and a failure to observe
formalities mirror their strength in Contract with decisions to pierce.294
These results tend to reinforce that Tort and Fraud present relatively comparable scenarios with respect to judicial reasoning, as distinguished from
Contract.
The greatest disparity, though, concerns evidence of fraud or
misrepresentation. On the one hand, with respect to voluntary creditors, the
rationale exhibits the same split as the overall dataset; ambiguous or general
evidence of fraud is instrumental in decisions not to pierce, in contrast to
specific evidence concerning assets or identity. On the other hand, with respect to involuntary creditors, the rationale is fairly neutral in a court's
decision to pierce; this is because the most common type of evidence of fraud
or misrepresentation is ambiguous or general evidence and is instrumental in
46.20% of cases that result in piercing. These results collectively provide
some support for arguments that fraud or misrepresentation presents a compelling exception to ex ante bargaining and insurance, yet a broad-based
justification for ex post compensation.2 95 And the evidence is particularly
noteworthy in light of the fact that very few jurisdictions require proof of
fraud or misrepresentation specifically for voluntary-creditor claims.2 96
Conclusion
Some pieces to the veil-piercing puzzle now appear to be in place, as the
findings here and from Thompson's study cohere in numerous ways. The
presumption in favor of corporate separateness is hardly axiomatic, with veilpiercing claims prevailing over 40% of the time and with virtually equal success in federal and state courts.2 97 Further, all courts will disregard the form
of only close corporationS298 and reach into the assets of individual
shareholders far more often than those of corporate parents; 299 both of these
dynamics merit additional investigation into the specifics of corporate groups

293. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
295. Interestingly, this asymmetry does not obtain for siphoning of funds or undercapitalization.
Cf Bainbridge,supra note 19, at 517-26 (proposing a regime of direct liability predicated on fraud
or misrepresentation, siphoning of funds, or undercapitalization).
296. Notable exceptions to this can be found in Texas and federal common law. See Subway
Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Sims (In re Sims), 994 F.2d 210, 218 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Although a finding
of fraud is not essential in [T]ort cases, 'in [C]ontract cases, fraud is an essential element of an alter
ego finding."' (citation omitted)); supra note 35.
297. See supra notes 157, 174-80 and accompanying text.
298. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
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to determine the composition of those shareholders and the ways in which
they influence how veil-piercing claims are litigated and adjudicated. Also
worth exploring are the reasons why veil-piercing continues to be grounded
overwhelmingly within Contract,300 which may require a more complete
understanding about the litigation patterns and settlement rates for different
substantive claims.30 1
But this study's findings do reveal that some empirics of veil-piercing
need revision. The results affirm the central role that Fraud, as an instrumental rationale and as a substantive claim, must occupy within any account
of veil-piercing; indeed, the extent to which the doctrine is permeated by
Fraud is manifest, even in its absence as a rationale, by spurring a substitution effect with other prominent factors or as a claim by expanding the
disparity in litigant success in Tort over Contract. 30 2 And the results realign
the theory and practice of veil-piercing with respect to distinct types of
creditors; courts find veil-piercing more compelling when faced with
creditors in Tort or of the involuntary sort, particularly when the ultimate
shareholder is an individual or there is evidence of financial misconduct. 30 3
In contrast, creditors in Contract or of the voluntary sort seem to face a fairly
neutral setting for veil-piercing; courts apparently do not impute any special
regard to the relative sophistication of bargaining parties or the type of
shareholder, with litigants experiencing fairly stable rates of success over the
past three decades.3 04 If a story is to be constructed from the data, it may be
that, with respect to veil-piercing, the comparison between Contract and Tort
is less valuable than Contract serving as a reference point for the relationship
between Tort and Fraud.
Nevertheless, we remain hostage to a mangled and muzzy doctrine. The
lack of consistency within the collective results reinforces that veil-piercing
would benefit from principled simplification, and if such options already
exist, from disciplined judicial attention. Some of the doctrine's most
vigorous criticisms have come from courts, which have condemned the use
of metaphors, denigrated the attenuated multifactor approach, and bemoaned
the confusing landscape of past decisions. Yet these problems were highlighted by I. Maurice Wormser's elegant synopsis almost a century ago and
detailed by Robert Thompson's empirical study almost two decades ago.
The results presented here afford us with an opportunity to engage in a reinvigorated debate that ultimately may produce a doctrine that truly befits the
title of Our Lady of the Common Law.

300. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
301. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
302. See supra Figure 7.
303. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.

304. See supra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.

